12.21.2011

Distressed Debt Themes for 2012

I think the one word to describe this year's distressed debt market was "unexpected."  Whether it be the tragedies in Japan, Congress pushing us to a near technical default, the subsequent U.S. government downgrade, heightened and unforeseen issues with Europe, and a number of surprising bankruptcy filings (MF, AMR, etc), this has been a tough year to price risk for a distressed debt investor.  According to HSBC's most recent "Hedge Fund Weekly", hedge funds classified as "Distressed Security, Global", excluding Paulson & Co affiliated funds, have seen year-to-date returns ranging from -9.5% to 7.4% with a number of funds hugging right around zero.

While I will save my post discussing the expectations for high yield returns for 2012 (I know, a fool's errand) for next week, I would like to talk about some issues and themes that distressed debt investors may possibly encounter through 2012.  But first, let us look at my favorite chart:  The number of distressed debt issuers traded over the course of the year:



(Note: I've cut the graph off as of two days ago to account for the dearth of trading around the holidays)


As this chart shows, the distressed opportunity set has increased precipitously over the past 12 months.  Many of the new opportunities comes from junior capital (TRUPS, preferred, unsecured bonds, etc) of European banks.  In addition, as the definition of distressed according to Bloomberg is a spread of over 1000 basis points along with a much tighter treasury curve, the bar is set a tad lower this year.  With that said, I think any investor you speak to participating in the distressed debt market would tell you there is a lot more to do at this time time year than last year.

In terms of themes, I might as well get the elephant in the room out as quickly as possible:  Europe.  I have read every major investment bank's credit outlook for 2012 and everyone's projections for next year's returns are based on possibly scenarios in Europe.  If you were to compare the two issues that rocked the equity markets over the past 12 years (the "Tech Bubble" and the "Mortgage Crisis"), issues in Europe are so heavily portended that I'm starting to wonder how much is already discounted in.  I mean, were people talking about the Tech Bubble in 1999, like they are talking about Europe today?  Were (informed) people talking about the mortgage crisis in 2007, like they are talking about Europe today?

I have no idea what is going to happen in Europe. I am not a macro analyst and find myself much more comfortable (and at an information advantage) discussing various bottoms-up situations than trying to guess which European Summit, if any will fix the problem.  With that said, you can't ignore the situation because that is what is driving monthly returns (in fact, an interesting data point: many funds have put on hold hiring fundamental analysts for the mere fact that the added value is muted by macroeconomic / Europe factors).

One way that I like to think about situations is determining, where on a bell curve, the situation is priced.  Here is the standard bell curve we all learn taking the CFA exam or intro stat:



Where the entire European debacle began to unfold, the +1/-1 standard deviation events were not priced in.  I'd say, with everyone focused on Europe, the +2/-2 standard deviation events are probably pretty closed to being priced in and the thing you have to worry about as a portfolio manager are the very far tails, for instance, and Italian default.  12 months ago if you told people you were pretty confident that Greece was going to default, they'd say, "You know, its a possibility...but probably not."  CDS on Greece has gone from 1000 basis points to 10,000 basis points (I don't have the points up front data in front of me) just this year.  Everyone expects some sort of Greek default.

The question I then fall back on is this:  Will Europe suffer a mild recession or a very bad recession?  The problem with a very bad recession is the domino effects it has on the rest of the world.  Here is the scenario:

  1. Europe falls into a bad recession
  2. Europeans purchase less due to austerity measures (wage cuts, higher taxes, etc)
  3. China's economy, which benefits from Europeans purchasing their goods, slows down on lower exports
  4. Australia, Singapore, Korea - all major exporters to China, slow down because China has slowed down because Europe has slowed down
  5. Global commodity prices (and definitely Australian real estate) drop because China has slowed down
  6. Major commodity producers, other than China, including Brazil, Canada, and Russia slow down because exports are lower due to lower prices and lower demand from everyone above
  7. Pain
Do I think this will all happen?  I am probably more likely to tell you these events will unfold than the average person on Wall Street.  But that's why there is something called "tail hedging" (Up until June, Australia CDS was one of the cheapest tail hedges out there).   

With that said, lets turn our focus to more structural / technical / non-European issues distressed debt investors will deal with in the coming year:

Lack of Liquidity and the Implications for Portfolio Management

I have discussed previously about the current abysmally low dealer inventories of corporate bonds. This has been driven by adoption of (absurd) regulation and de-risking of dealer desks across the Street.  What concerns me is that as absolute yields in the high yield / leveraged loan marketplace has decreased while at the same time the relative yield offered by high yield / lev loans relative to other fixed income has increased, the amount of retail money that has flown into the space has increased precipitously.  More retail money means more needs for cash and daily liquidity.  This has a dramatic effect on how a PM will manage a book.

First, it means that the relative spread between illiquid and liquid issuers should increase.  As more daily liquidity is needed, the demand for larger / on-the run bonds increases relative to smaller issues.  This should cause stressed high yield, which is generally illiquid, to gap out even further when bad news hits the tape.  The additional volatility will cause distressed debt investors to demand a higher discount rate when purchasing small issues meaning lower prices.  If you extend this to the point of financial distress, companies should be pushed into bankruptcy more frequently as the need for higher IRRs for distressed suppliers of capital becomes impossible to bear for the marginal issuer.

Secondly, inflows and outflows are inherently volatile and streaky (returns -> more inflows -> higher returns -> further inflows).  And because cash management will be focused on the most liquid issuers, these issuers will experience a whole different sort of volatility.  Now, you may not think this is important until you look at the top holdings of many of the well-known high yield mutual funds: TXU, Sprint, Clear Channel, First Data, HCA, Harrah's / Caesars, etc.  Most of the issuers have rich capital structures with every sort of layer imaginable.  And as spreads widen due to the aforementioned volatility in the senior parts of these capital structures, the junior parts of the capital structure will widen out precipitously.  This is a sort of minefield for investors that will have to be reckoned with next year.  

Third, and sort of a byproduct of our second effect, is that cash balances, should in theory be hire.  This concerns me because when cash balances are high, the propensity for rallies to extend past economical sense increases.  If I am a mutual fund manager sitting of 5% cash position and the asset class grinds in every single week, at some point, I am going to lower my cash balance and spread more gasoline on the fire.

Fourth, and possibly a stretch, private equity will target larger companies next year and the years beyond.  To me, it's a lot easier to finance a $5 billion entity that is levered 4.0x versus a $500M entity levered 3.0x, all else being equal.  And with the amount of capital sitting on the sidelines of private equity, just waiting to be deployed, I think you'll see some big game being taken down next year.

Lower Recovery Rates

Many high yield strategists use a fairly simple formula to calculate projected high yield spreads and as a result, total return over a projected period:  

[100% less Estimated Recovery Rates] * Default Rate Forecast + Excess Spread = Spread Estimates

The problem with this equation is pretty simple:  Excess Spread changes with market volatility.  In a very volatile markets, excess spread, or the spread an investor requires to be paid above what he expects to lose in a default scenario, increases dramatically.  Hence, you have a circular equation.

More important to our discussion is my estimation that we will see lower recovery rates in the future, more specifically in the lower parts of the capital structure.  Whether it be bank debt or secured bonds, more senior leverage is being put on capital structures, leaving junior note holders in a more levered position.  Furthermore, the extremely weak covenant packages put into credit agreements and indentures between 4Q 2009 and 2Q 2011 means while the chance of an actual default is less (less likely to trip covenants if they don't exist), the companies that do default will already have been burned to the ground.  

 Higher Default Rates but still Relatively Benign

Despite my concerns in Europe, I cannot dismiss the data that suggests high yield issuers in the United States have the strongest balance sheets, collectively than in anytime in the modern history of high yield.  And the maturity wall is really just a hill now:


We always see a few surprises each year.  This year, other than MF, we saw AMR file.  Of every analyst covering AMR on the equity and debt side, very few, if any, thought AMR would file in 2011.  Dynegy is a similar story given the pricing of the various HY indices.  Jump risk is something we all have to contend with in the distressed market and 2012 will be no different.  I would expect default rates to increase into the latter half of the year as CFOs and investors alike begin to look out 12-18 months when lots of bonds and bank debt are maturing while at the same time the amount of firepower of CLO purchasing power dwindles due to the closing of their reinvestment windows.

With lower recovery rates in the junior tranches, I'd expect distressed investors to make an even more pronounced move into 1st lien paper (akin to Oaktree's strategy).  Something like a Travelport 1st lien comes to mind.  

More Cash to Invest due to Distributions from Liquidations

Lehman.  Nortel.  Washington Mutual.  To the innocent by-standers eye, simply three companies that filed for bankruptcy.  To me, and many other distressed investors:  An oasis or bastion of safety.  Nortel has been one of the best performing distressed bonds all year.  WAMU, whichever flavor you choose, has been a solid performer the past few weeks.  And Lehman:  Lehman has let you allocate billions of dollars of capital in just a few trades allowing you to show your investors your are more allocated than you really are while at the same time grinding out returns.  I have a recovery price in the low 30s for LBHI.  Every day I suspect my bonds will grind their way there with little no volatility.

Unfortunately, this party is about to end.  Lehman should start paying out distributions soon, and its just a matter of time for WAMU and Nortel once all the arbitration gets settled and the plan is confirmed, respectively.  Distressed debt investors will find a bunch of cash from these distributions in their fund, looking for similar places to put the capital.  But really, there aren't a lot of situations like that right now.  MF could turn into such a situation, but we are far from that will over a billion dollars still missing.  Maybe this capital will move into something like merger arbitrage (remember our point above about private equity taking down larger targets).  I'd expect to see DIPs massively oversubscribed next year on the bankruptcies we see.  Maybe the capital will move into Europe as European banks trickle out assets despite new collateral rules letting them pledge anything under the sun.  Or maybe investors start taking bold position in deeply distressed situations looking for control while at the same time exposing their investors to more volatility.  My dark horse candidate:  A healthy push into sub-prime and other non-agency RMBS and CMBS. 

Activism (in and out of the bankruptcy court) to Increase

In my opinion, and as mentioned above, the financing market for good and sizable companies is healthy right now.  A healthy financing market fuels activists as they can push for a hostile offer more reasonably with committed financing.  And even if they really do not want to take the company private, the white knight will also find himself with many options to finance a purchase.  For investors in credit, I think the combination of a healthy financing market AND lower recoveries for junior tranches will push distressed investors to write large equity / rights offering checks to give them a chance to recover their investment less they hand the keys over to senior creditors.  We saw this with Great Atlantic.  

As capital structures get more fragmented / layered, and intercreditor agreements become more friendly to revolving lenders, junior creditors are in a unique spot to "create their own recovery" as it were.  One of the most successful endeavors of this sort was Six Flags, where originally bank debt was going to retain the equity.  Then it was the opco noteholders.  Then finally, after a large equity check, the holdco noteholders took over the company and we know what happened there:


And to answer your next question:  Doesn't this contradict with what you said about lower recovery rates?  No.  In fact, it worries me because smaller investors that cannot participate in rights offerings will see a much lower ULTIMATE recovery than their peers that have the chance to participate in an equity check.

This strategy is bound to be profitable, assuming a low enough purchase price, as EVENTUALLY, Europe will correct itself, and valuations across industries will increase  If you can purchase a company in distressed with cheap financing, delever the structure, and fix operations, I think you'll have yourself a home run. 

Conclusion

Everyone is calling for 2012 to be a volatile year.  I hope just the opposite: I hope everything goes lower and assets across the board get cheaper.  But with everyone painting a doomsday scenario, I'm not quite sure that will happen.  The market is NOT ready for a sustained bullish rally - too many investors are flat or are running with a low gross exposure.  The only thing that I've known to be true in macro prognosticating: The market will move in a way that hurts the most people at anyone time.  If everyone is long, it will go lower.  The pain trade today, surprisingly, is up.  It's going to be a hell of an interesting year.  Good luck.

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12.18.2011

Distressed Debt Weekly Links of Interest AND a few Updates to Recent Posts

This week I am going to try something new.  Because there was a litany of news from the docket of a number of the bankruptcies we have followed in the past, I thought it would be beneficial to the reader to get a summary on some of the proceedings.  First the updates, then the weekly links of interest:

Great Atlantic settles with Secured Note Holders: We have discussed the Great Atlantic & Pacific Company's bankruptcy in a number of posts.  Most recently we discussed the calculation of the claim value of the company's Second Lien Senior Secured Note Holders.  This week it was announced that the company has entered into a plan support agreement (PSA) settling the amount of the claim at $304M with per-diem adjustments of $108,000 if the company exits bankruptcy before or after the assumed March 1, 2012 date.  This works out to an approximately 119 price on the bond.  I have to assume the company, under the direction of the junior note holders who are funding the rights offering, wanted to avoid any sort of delay in the bankruptcy confirmation (which may have been held up if the Second Liens litigated for the make whole).

Dynegy and PSEG reach agreement on Roseton / Danskhammer leases:  Importantly, this does not settle the amount of the lease rejection claim in the bankruptcy court.  As first discussed in this post: Dynegy's Bankruptcy, Dynegy filed for bankruptcy in November to restructure its capital structure and reject the leases on the Roseton and Danskhammer power plants.  What this agreement does though is leaves the pass-through notes as the only really opponent to the rejection of these leases and the associated damage claims.  Under the agreement, PSEG would receive an allowable claim of $110M against Dynegy and would receive $7.5M in cash from Dynegy, among other things.  From a valuation perspective, this means that the unsecured bond holders will receive slightly less as claims have increased marginally at the debtor.

And now the "Weekly Links of Interest"

An amazing insider look at manager's capital allocation decisions [hat tip Joe Koster's Value Investing World]

Another one from Joe:  A series of lectures from Bruce Greenwald's Value Investing classes at Columbia Business School [Value Investing World]

Zero Hedge's Chronicle of the Last Days at MF Global [Zero Hedge]

Latham Watkins with a detailed look on the amended Bankruptcy Rule 2019 [Latham Watkins]

Sardar Biglari's 2011 Annual Letter to Shareholders [Biglari Holdings]

Kyle Bass at AmeriCatalyst 2011 (amazing video!)

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12.15.2011

New Items in the Right Sidebar of Distressed Debt Investing

First off, I'd like to thank everyone that has volunteered to write for the site. I would say we have 3 of our 5 spots definitively filled, and you soon will see their names / affiliations / links to all the articles they write in the right sidebar in the coming months. If you are interested, please contact me via email.


Importantly though, I received about 20-25 emails for people wanting to write about a specific situation here or there, but not with a firm commitment. I always find myself (and I am sure many others do as well) with too little time to cover and analyze every situation. With that said, I thought I would try an experiment: On the right sidebar, you will see a section entitled "Want to help out?" Whenever a situation comes up that either (1) I haven't followed and someone who knows the situation well would be better suited to write it up or (2) Many readers request a post on a particular topic of discussion and I don't have time, I will update that box.

So currently it read: "I am looking for someone to analyze PMI and determine the value of its unsecured bonds" PMI filed for bankruptcy a few weeks ago and bonds have drifted lower (even more so recently with the CDS auction). If you have looked at the situation, and would like to help out, all I ask is you email a few paragraphs to one/two pages explaining the situation and stamping a reasonable set of parameters / assumptions to get to a valuation.

When I get a sufficient response, I will use the work in question and develop a more comprehensive post incorporating elements from the author. And to get in front of a few questions I will get asked: Anything you send to me is 100% private / anonymous. If you would like me to post your name / affiliation, I will do that, but privacy is of the utmost importance around these parts.

Once the new post is up, I will change the "Want to Help Out Request" to a new situation and hopefully get more responses. I think this system will benefit all because (in theory) I will be able to cover more situations, more efficiently, and you as the reader, will be able to see more analysis of the many bankruptcies that seem to crop up more and more each day. Contributors will be granted a 6 months membership to the DDIC, access to me for resume/case study services/job search help for free, and will be invited to be a trial / beta user for our new project to be announced in 2012.

Here's to hoping we have a few PMI analysts out there! If you have any questions / thoughts, always feel free to email me at hunter [at] distressed-debt-investing [dot] com

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12.14.2011

Washington Mutual and DIMEQ

One security that has fascinated me and many investors for a number of months is the Dime litigation tracking warrants (DIMEQ). Without getting into the nitty gritty details and history of litigation participation certificates (If you are interested, read this document: POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF LAW OF DIMEQ), the issue regarding DIMEQ in the Washington Mutual bankruptcy is whether the security should be considered equity of pre-bankrupt Washington Mutual, which for all intents and purposes is worth very very little, or something else entirely.

On one side of the table you had desk analysts arguing that DIMEQ will be considered equity and hence WAMU Holdco bonds would get a pop because they will receive a larger slice of pie (recovery). On the other side, you have one of the most focused legion of vested independent investors I have seen, discussing a very complicated issue, at the DIMEQ InvestorHub Message Board.

Earlier this week, Washington Mutual filed its 7th bankruptcy plan and disclosure statement. For those interested, here are the documents: WAMU's 7th Amended Plan and Disclosure Statement.

One investor that has been following the situation religiously is DDIC member Madclown, who writes a wonderful little blog entitled The Diligent Investor, which focuses on bankruptcy situations that most retail investors can participate. He contacted me last night with a post on the WAMU Plan and Disclosure Statement, which I've copied and pasted below. Enjoy!

Assessing the Impact of WAMU’s Reorganization Plan on the Dime Litigation Tracking Warrants (DIMEQ)

On December 12, 2011 Washington Mutual released the Seventh version of its Plan and Disclosure Statement. Woven within the Plan is a settlement agreement that provides for a recovery to equity holders in the form of Newco stock while dismissing charges levied by the Equity Committee against certain creditors for Insider Trading; charges that the Court found to be “colorable claims”. The recovery to equity represents a significant departure from the 6th Amended version of the Plan which did not provide for any recovery to equity.

These changes effectively put a floor of value underneath the litigation tracking warrants ("LTW") in a worst-case scenario if the Court rules against the LTW Holders in the Adversary Proceeding because the Plan provides that, in the event that the Court finds that the LTWs represent equity interests as opposed to either Class 12 General Unsecured claims or equitable lien claims, the LTWs will share a 30% stake in the Reorganized Company pari passu with common equity. In order to find that floor of value one must first determine what the reorganized Company is worth and then determine the proper conversion rate of LTWs into common equity to find the relative ownership percentage of this 30% stake for DIMEQ and WAMUQ. For simplicity’s sake we will assume that the Newco is worth $210 million which is the value assigned by the Court for the purposes of deciding “who gets what” under the Plan. As to the issue of the conversion rate, the Plan provides that the relative value of DIMEQ will be determined to be the lesser of:
  • The amount estimated by the Bankruptcy Court as the maximum amount in which the Disputed Claims relating to the Dime Warrants may ultimately become Allowed Claims times the per share price of Common Equity Interests on a date established by the Bankruptcy Court bears to the market capitalization of all other Common Equity Interests (as determined by the Bankruptcy Court using such same per share price)
  • The liquidated amount determined, pursuant to an order of the Bankruptcy Court, as the amount in which the Disputed Claims relating to the Dime Warrants are Allowed Claims times the per share price of Common Equity Interests on a date established by the Bankruptcy Court bears to the market capitalization of all other Common Equity Interests (as determined by the Bankruptcy Court using such same per share price)
  • The amount established by the United States Court of Federal Claims in the Anchor Litigation, pursuant to a Final Order, as applied in connection with the Dime Warrant Litigation, times the per share price of Common Equity Interests on a date established by the Bankruptcy Court bears to the market capitalization of all other Common Equity Interests (as determined by the Bankruptcy Court using such same per share price)
  • Such other amount as may be agreed upon by the plaintiffs in the Dime Warrant Litigation and the Liquidating Trustee; provided, however, the recovery in connection with the Dime Warrant Litigation will not exceed the lesser of (1), (2), (3) and (4) above,
I contend that this conversion rate is patently improper because it basically converts one share of DIMEQ into one share of WAMUQ and then adds the relative market caps and divides the total back into the improperly constructed DIMEQ market cap. The Debtor’s conversion method inexplicably ignores the conversion rate provided for by the LTW Agreement and further memorialized in an 8-k filed on March 13, 2003. Under the proper conversion method the “Adjusted Litigation Recovery” is divided by the “Merger Adjusted Stock Price” and then further divided by the number of outstanding LTWs. See calculation below.

So what exactly am I saying is the proper conversion rate? To simplify, we basically have to add the relative value of the LTW claims to the market capitalization of WAMUQ (1.7 Billion shares times the market share price of WAMUQ at a date to be determined) and then divide that total back into the value of the LTW claims. Now there are 4 possible amounts to assign as the value of the LTW claims which includes the lesser of the Estimated Claims ($337 million), the final allowed claims determined by the Bankruptcy Court (TBD), the final allowed claims determined by the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (TBD) and any stipulated amount agreed upon by and between the Liquidating Trustee and the LTW Plaintiffs (TBD or N/A).

We know what the highest possible claim amount is for DIMEQ and that would be the estimated Disputed Claims Reserve amount of $337 million. If one assumes that the LTW Plaintiffs don’t agree to less in a stipulated settlement, then the lowest amount that could be assigned to the LTWs would appear to be in the $228 million context. One can arrive at that value by taking the $356 million “pre-grossup” award from the Federal Claims Court (assuming the additional $63 million award is not awarded) plus the $104 million grossup less estimated litigation and issuance expenses of $22 million and that total then multiplied by a 38.757% tax rate (JPM’s estimate) and then reduced by 15% for the 85/15 split with WMI.


This whole exercise is, of course, a moot point if the Court finds that the LTWs constitute Unsubordinated General Unsecured Claims. The Court may also find that the LTW Claims are secured claims in the event that the Plaintiffs prevail on their Equitable Lien via Constructive Trust theory. In any event, whether the LTWs represent Unsubordinated Claims or Equity Interests and whether the Debtors prevail in their use of an improper conversion rate, it is now clear that the LTWs have value. What is also implicit in all of this is that barring any stipulated settlement between the Debtors and the LTW Plaintiffs, the Court will still have to conduct a final claims estimation hearing for the LTWs.

One final point I will make here is that the Plan currently provides that if the LTWs are deemed to be Equity Interests then they are an impaired Class and are not entitled to vote. Under this Plan construct it would apparently foreclose an LTW Holder from appealing the Judge’s decision to the District Court. Since there are many issues involved in the LTW Adversary Proceeding that are appealable and in the event that the Court finds the LTWs to represent Equity Interests, the LTW Holders should be given an election to either accept the treatment provided for under the Plan and to grant the applicable releases or in the alternative should be given an election to reject the treatment under the Plan, grant no releases, and take up any adverse ruling on appeal.

Conclusion - And most importantly, bottom-lining it:

The max upside in this case for DIMEQ that would result from being classified as a Class 12 GUC claimant or an equitable lienholder is about $3.00 per LTW (versus today ~ 65 cents) before post-petition interest if the full $337 million reserve goes to the LTW Holders. If the federal judgment rate is applied to that award for 3.5 years it moves the recovery up to about $3.20. On the downside, if DIMEQ is deemed to be Equity and if the Debtor prevails in applying the improper conversion rate then the worst scenario based on Plan value would put the DIMEQ security between $0.07 and $0.10.



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12.12.2011

Distressed Debt News: Lee Bankruptcy Filing

Today, Lee Enterprises ("Lee" or "the Company") filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in Delaware. This was anticipated per an 8K filed last week by the Company that stated:

"Pursuant to the Lee Support Agreement and the Pulitzer Support Agreement, the News Release announced, among other things, that Lee and its majority-owned subsidiaries expect to file voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code on or about December 12, 2011. Lee’s interests in Tucson, AZ, and Madison, WI, are not included in the filing. The Chapter 11 filings will be made pursuant to a “prepackaged” restructuring plan with the support of Lee’s Supporting Lenders (who represent approximately 94% of the total outstanding loans) and the Supporting Noteholders (who have provided unanimous support).
For those interested, the Lee Bankruptcy docket can be found here: Lee Bankruptcy Docket and the main claims agent page can be found here: Lee Claims Agent Page. As usual, we've added the docket to our bankruptcy docket page which can be found here: Distressed Debt Investing collection of bankruptcy dockets.

For reference, as of this evening, Lee Enterprises's term loan as well as its revolver, traded in the 66-68 context. As of the petition date, there was $548M of Term Loan outstanding and and $308M of outstanding borrowings under its revolver.

Negotiations for this pre-pack have been going on for sometime. For those in the market, you may remember Lee attempting to market a refinancing package earlier this year in the April/May time period for its debt maturing in 2012. When that didn't work out, negotiations began and eventually entered into a support agreement in August of this year with votes on the pre-pack being solicited in November.

The essence of the plans is as follows:
  • $40M DIP via Deutsche Bank will roll into new revolving credit facility
  • Existing holders of pre-petition credit facility will receive their $689.5M of a new first lien term loan facility and $175M of a new second lien facility (that has been backstopped by Goldman Sachs, Mutual Quest [Franklin Templeton], Monarch, Mudrick, and Blackwell Partners. The first lien facility is set to mature in December 2015, with the second lien maturing in April 2017. The pricing is L+625, with a 1.5% floor and 15% respectively (with a 5 point OID on the second lien)
  • Second lien lenders will also receive 15% of the outstanding stock on a PF basis
  • The "Pulitzer" noteholders will increase their coupon to 10.55% (that increase with time) and extend the maturity to 2015 and will see some debt paydown
  • Existing shareholders will retain their interests (holding 85% of the company before management incentive plans).
I will not that the 8K had slightly different figures for equity retention versus the disclosure statement (87% vs 85%).

Financial Projections from the Disclosure Statement (Exhibit F), are as follows:

Income Statement


Balance Sheet


Cash Flows


LTM EBITDA at Lee is around $170M. This versus the anticipated $990M of debt leads to leverage of 5.8x. This seems awfully high when you consider McClatchy trades at 5.5x today, but this seems to be already reflected in the market given the current trading price of Lee's credit facilities. I.E. With ~$860M of pre-petition credit facilities trading at 67, the market is implying a value of about $575M for the entity. This implies the new first and second lien paper will trade at a steep discount when they begin to trade. With that said, the company is projected to generate free cash flow of about $55M each year in the projection periods which will be used to de-lever the balance sheet.

First day hearings are scheduled for noon tomorrow in Wilmington with standard first day motions for a company putting forward a pre-pack. Lee is expected to exit bankruptcy within 60 days. We will keep readers updated if trading levels get to a price that interests us.

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Email

hunter [at] distressed-debt-investing [dot] com

About Me

I have spent the majority of my career as a value investor. For the past 8 years, I have worked on the buy side as a distressed debt and high yield investor.