4.30.2009

More Chrysler Bankruptcy Information

So the docket is beginning to fill up: Chrysler Bankruptcy Information


As of 12/31/2008, the "Chrysler Companies" (as defined as debtors and non-debtors direct and indirect subsidiaries) listed $39.3B of assets and $55.2B of liabilities. Revenue in 2008 looks to be $48.4B.

From the joint administration filing: Under a liquidation "Chrysler's first lien secured creditors will receive net present value recoveries of less than 38 cents on the dollar and possibly as little as 9 cents; the U.S. government, another secured creditor, will receive less than that; and Chrysler's unsecured creditors will receive nothing."

And the real juice: Chrysler Bankruptcy Affidavit

My takeaways:
  • Filed by the CFO, Ronald Kolka.
  • Goes on to talk about how imperative it is to avoid a liquidation.
  • Asking the Court to approve a 363 sale, financially backed by the U.S. Gov't
  • 30% of first lien debt holders are against the sale. The affidavit goes on to say that Chrysler bank debt trades at 15 cents on the dollar. That is definitely not the market that a certain dealer that starts with Goldman and ends in Sachs is making right this very moment.
  • Goes on to talk about the things I talked about in my last post: Chrysler Bankruptcy
  • Upon consummation of the 363 sale, the major assets of old Chrysler would be 8 manufacturing facilities, and related machinery and equipment with a book value of $2.3B. The U.S. Gov't would provide $200M through the DIP loan to run a wind-down and sale of the estate.
  • Description of Business: No need to rehash what everyone knows.
  • Organizational and Capital Structure: Outstanding amount under the First Lien is $6.9B (as of petition date). Secured by first lien in all Chrysler's assets, a 65% equity pledge of foreign subs, and other guarantees. $2B second lien delayed draw term loan. $4B TARP loan, third lien to first lien's security. $5.3B of trade debt.
  • Events Leading to the Petition: Again, everyone knows this. Blame Cerberus.
  • More talk on the FIAT alliance
  • And lots of first day motions, fairly typical in nature.
Here is Balance Sheet:

We can try to put some kind of recovery on each of these assets, and compare to the $6.9B of First Lien Bank debt (and some trade, estimated at $800M, will have critical vendor status / 20 day rule [503b9 claims], as well as bankruptcy administration fees).  

Assuming bankruptcy fees of $1B and $800M of "20-day claims" are ahead of you, at 25-30 cents on the dollar, the bank debt is implying $3.5B-$3.8B of value. Versus $39B of listed assets, with $1.9B of that cash.  Doesn't seem that too far of a stretch - unless the DIP gets super priority, and primes the shit out everyone. Maybe those crazy hedge fund pirates holdouts had the right idea. 

There are some other interesting affidavits from the head of manufacturing, head of procurement, head of dealers, etc. These are filed under Dockets Item Numbers: 48-54. They are interesting reads. Basically go on to say how imperative this Fiat deal is to everyone in the world. 

More tomorrow on the Chrysler bankruptcy.

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Chrysler Bankruptcy

Chrysler filed for bankruptcy today. For reference, as of now, this is the only docket information I can find (outside of Pacer logins)


Petitions can be found here: Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Court. Here is more information I just found: Chrysler Restructuring Website

As of right now, the Carco bank debt is trading at 25.25-27.25, with Finco (the auto financing arm) first lien trading at 77.25-79.25 and second lien trading at 52-55. Yesterday - at about this time, the Carco was trading at 23-27, with FinCo's first lien trading at 63-65 and the second lien trading at 34.5-37.5. As you can see, the FinCo lenders are loving this (up LOTS on both tranches). Maybe one of the reasons a number of funds did not play ball? Because their exposure to FinCo relative to CarCo?


And my takeaways (from a distressed investor:
  • Chrysler will use a 363 sale for its relaunch
  • Details of the Chrysler Fiat Alliance - maintain existing factor footprint, Fiat contributing technology and IP (but no capital???). And getting 20% of the stock with earn out rights of 15% more of the equity (5% tranches) for meeting performance metrics.
  • UAW accepting concessions but probably won't be enough
  • Lenders will receive $2B of cash on a $6.9B claim. That translates to 29 cent recovery. This will be forced on dissenting creditors (do they have the required votes?)
  • Daimler waiving its $2B of second lien debt, give up its equity, and settle PBGC claims for $600M
  • Cerberus waiting its $2B of second lien claim and forfeit its equity stake.
  • VEBA will be established financed with a $4.6B 13 year, 9% note and will receive 55% of the new equity of Chrysler.
  • U.S. Treasury receiving 8% of the new equity. Can select 4 independent directors. Canada/Ontario to receive 2% of the new equity.
  • U.S will provide a $3.3B DIP as well as provide $4.7B in exit financing to New Chrysler (First Lien Term Loan with varying maturity schedules), and a $288M note which is a fee for making these loans.
  • Canada/Ontario participating on a formula/basis
  • Chrysler will use GMAC for financing. SO THAT IS HOW CERBERUS IS GETTING SOME LOVING IN THIS DEAL (CERBERUS OWNS ~50% of GMAC). Gmac Bond's have rallied today.
  • More lambasting of smart hedge funds.
  • Employees getting paid, suppliers getting paid, customer warranties getting paid. U.S. taxpayers - not getting paid.
Edit #1: This is a good read: Stubborn Lenders

Much, much more when the filings start hitting the docket. All I can say...Fiat 1 - U.S. Taxpayers 0. The Chrysler bankruptcy is going to be an interesting one.

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Distressed Debt Investing Thanks You

When I started Distressed Debt Investing, I had no idea where it would go or what it would become. I knew that I wanted to enlighten experienced and inexperienced investors alike with the distressed debt investing process, what was going on in the distressed debt world, and how to profit from it. And maybe a few off topic posts where I could collect my thoughts on other value investing topics.

I am deeply humbled by all the kind words and emails that I have received over the past 4 weeks. I really am sincerely grateful. I am astounded to say that Distressed Debt Investing now has over 400 RSS Subscribers and receiving over 1000 page views a day. It is flabbergasting to say the least.

I want to thank a number of journalists and bloggers that have linked to my posts: Stephen Grocer at the WSJ, Aaron Pressman at Business Week, Gwen Robinson at the FT, George at Value Investing News, Market Folly, Abnormal Returns, Mr Markets Value, Greenbackd, Wide Moat Investing, Miguel at Nightly Investment Links, Lawrence's Blog, Barel Karsan, Noise Free Investing, The Safe and Cheap Blog, and probably a few more than I am forgetting (shoot me an email and I'll add you to this list!)

I am always here to help out our readers. If you have questions, comments, thoughts, need advice on jobs, case study questions, want to rant about GGP, or anything, you can contact me at hunter [at] distressed-debt-investing [dot] com. I will try to respond as fast as humanly possible. Also, If you want to write a guest post, please let me know - we are always looking for great content here at Distressed Debt Investing.

Once again, thank you all so much.

-Hunter

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4.28.2009

Anatomy of Common Stock Due Diligence

Generally, distressed debt hedge funds as well as event-driven hedge funds do not just go long and short distressed debt bonds. In their books (portfolios), they will also own value based equities, index hedges, private equities, cheap performing bonds, etc. One thing most of them will certainly have in their portfolios is shorts on certain equity names.

One of the best books on the subject is "The Art of Short Selling" by Kathryn Staley.

I stumbled upon this book when I found a link to a Blue Ridge Capital Reading List. For those unaware, Blue Ridge Capital was the original Tiger Cub. John Griffin, its founder, was #2 at Tiger Management working under Julian Robertson in its heyday. They are long/short value investors. Some of their biggest holdings (according to the 12/31/2008 13F) include Microsoft, Covanta, Berkshire Hathaway, National Oilwell Varco, and Mastercard (I hold two of these stocks in my personal account).

In her book, Staley goes on to list some general themes/baskets that certain shorts regularly fall. They include: "Bubble Stocks", high growth stocks with sky high multiples, stocks where the SEC filings don't quite make sense, companies that burn through lots of cash and need tons of capital, heavily indebted companies, "for sale but not sold company", companies that are hiding deteriorating earnings with one off gains, companies in secularly declining industries, or all of the above.

A problem that many short sellers find themselves is a company who's stock goes higher and higher in spite of an obviously deteriorating condition (just pick one of the above). The market is irrational at times. Many hedge fund managers covered their GGP stock in early 2008 when the stock rallied to the low 40s from the low 30s. A year and a few months later, the stock trades at 60 cents. Many funds got crushed when the government banned short selling of banks. You may be right in the long run, but when you are giving your investors month to month or quarter to quarter numbers, you need to be right in the short run. Admittedly, one of the flaws of the hedge fund model which I dutifully subscribe to as an active participant.

Now, I want to start off by saying that this post is not a recommendation one way or the other to short the stock that we are going to begin to do due diligence on. I have no economic interest one way or the other in this stock. If you do your research, figure out its a good short, then I suggest you put it on. Otherwise, look at this post as more of a way as I how I approach common stock investing (on the short side).

Just like many value investors look at the 52 week low list for long value plays, some people, including myself, look at the 52 week high list for short plays. You can access this list on Bloomberg or various other financial sites on the web (do a Google search). Earlier in the week, I saw that Darden Restaurants (DRI) had ticked off a high on April 22nd.

For those that do not know, DRI owns and operates a number of restaurant chains - very well known chains such as Red Lobster, Olive Garden, Longhorn Steakhouse, etc. I was surprised to see such a stock on the 52 week high list - why? Because in recessions, I would assume people eat out significantly less. So why not investigate and see what we can find?

The first thing that I do when researching a common stock, whether it be long or short, is read the last three annual reports. Why three? That's what my boss told me my first day on the buy-side, and I just haven't experimented enough to see if one, three, five, or ten is the right number. These can be found here: Darden Annual Reports.

One caveat. I will go back quite a few years and read the shareholder letter. I want to see if the shareholder letter actually matches up with how the company performs in future years. Also I want a realistic shareholder letter. I.E. If I read a shareholder letter from 2008 where the author is all bulled up on the economy, I generally laugh and move the idea to the short pile. And in some situations, if a business is very cyclical, I will go back to the annual reports of the last down cycle to see what was happening.

What else am I looking at when reading the Annual Reports? Not only do I want to see how the business is performing, I also want to see how management is using their capital. Were they buying back stock at the highs in 2007? Were they levering up for acquisitions in the same year? How has capex trended with sales and what is the return on that capital employed. Does CFO match trends in net income. What are the accounting assumptions?

Pension assumptions are the most overlooked information in an annual report. While DRI's pension plan is fairly small relative to the size of the enterprise, from the 2008 DRI Annual Report, DRI is assuming a 9% expected return on plan assets. Definitely aggressive in the context of real world returns.

Other things I look at: I read the notes voraciously. I want to get an insight that other people may have glossed over. Remember, investing is a zero sum game. For every winner, there is a loser. I like to win. Unfortunately, I should just do a whole post about reading an annual report, cover to cover, and I will do that in the future.

I then read the last three proxy statements. These can be found here:

Darden 2008 Proxy
Darden 2007 Proxy
Darden 2006 Proxy

Why do I read the proxy statement? Well for a few reasons. I like to see the make up of the board (and how they are paid), I want to see management holdings of stock, I like to see the proposals shareholders are voting for and how management responds, and a few others. The two most important things to look at when reading a proxy is: 1) How is management compensated and 2) What related party transactions have been taking place

In regards to #1, you want a management team that is compensated for things like return on capital, not sales. Why? Because a management team can pump up sales by spending capital on low return projects. All this will be under the report from the compensation committee. While it may be counter intuitive, I like to see management being compensated with restricted and common stock, yet I generally dislike when compensation is linked to stock performance. This just gives management an incentive to cheat and lie to boost their stock price. I want a management team to think like owners. I also want to see that compensation for a certain year was in line with what the business actually did...i.e. I do not want to see lots of bonuses paid out for a terrible year.

In regards to #2, it is fairly self explanatory. The less insider / related party transactions the better. DRI has none which is a gold star in my book.

After reading the last three annual reports and proxies, I should be fairly comfortable about what the business does, its drivers, how they make money, where the capital is being spent and at what targeted return, etc. From here I will read as many conference calls and corporate presentations I can stand. You can find the conference calls on Seeking Alpha, or if you are an institutional investor on Bloomberg or Street Events. Good investor relations departments put all their historical presentations on the website, easy to find for investors. That reminds me, I will also spend quite a bit of time reviewing the corporate website, trying to get a better understand of the business. Lots of jewels to be mined there.

Why do I read the presentations and conference calls? Well first of all, I want to figure out the shared expectations of the market and the concerns of the market. Generally, an investor relations department will tailor their presentations to analysts questions and concerns. I.E. If a company is getting a lot of questions on its liquidity in private conversations with analysts and buy side professionals, the investor relations department will stick a slide in saying how great liquidity is. Always happens. On the conference call, follow the Q/A section and see what people are asking about and concerned about. You make money in the market by having different expectations about the future than the general consensus. If you think 2010 and beyond free cash flow will be substantially higher than the analyst community, you would be more apt to buy the stock.

After reading the annual report, proxies, conference calls, and presentations you should have a pretty good understanding about the business, the markets perception of the business etc. You now need to do your comp work. And I do not mean build a comp sheet.

Where do you get your comps? A lot of the good ones are in the proxy. In DRI's case, in the 2008 proxy, on page 43 of 84 of the PDF document, the company lists its peer group. I then go in and add my own (and maybe take out a few I do not find appropriate). For example, Cheesecake Factory (CAKE) is not on this list. I'd add it in. This is where you start making calls. Lots of them. While you could go back and read every one of these companies 10Ks and proxies and conference calls if you had all the time in the world, you just do not have that much time if you are new to the situation. As an aside, that is why I believe people with industry expertise in portfolio management have a substantial edge.

Back to the due diligence calls. I will call each one of these competitors that I find relevant and talk to the investor relations department and hopefully the CFO about the business in which I am studying. Darden, being a chain restaurant, there are so many questions you could ask that would give you great insight about the inner workings of the business. I might ask Bob Evans Farms how guest counts and average check size is trending in certain markets that DRI has a big presence in. I may ask Kohl's how store closures in strip malls is affecting their business and the business around them. I may ask Zales their thoughts on mall traffic. I'd ask McDonald's what they think is happening with minimum wages in Congress. I might ask each of these companies their thoughts on the chain food business for the next three of four years and how the competitive dynamic is shaping. I'd ask each of them what trade magazines are relevant and then try to read some information on the industry / trade on the web.

You get the picture. You want to get insights into the business in which you are examining and insights into the strengths / problems the market is focusing on to exploit diversions between reality and opinion. I am telling you, less than 5% of buy side professionals do this. Why? Maybe they are too busy building excel models or maybe they believe Investor Relations' job is to blow smoke up every one's ass. I don't know. If you are smart about it, you can get good information from these people.

So now you know a fair deal about the business, the industry, what is going on in the real world. From here it depends on the company being analyzed. You want some real on the ground, scuttlebutt research. For DRI, I may call 10-15 different restaurants and chat up the hostess or manager and get some information about what is going on in the stores. How has business been? What's new to the menu? What are customers liking? Etc. For other businesses, I may call direct competitors or maybe even suppliers to get the same sort of information.

At this point, you should have a pretty solid opinion of what is going on in the business. At this point, I will throw together a few excel spreadsheets. The first will be a model (with some historical included) that will have three or four drivers. At this point, with all your due diligence, you should know the drivers. If not, go back and call the competitors and figure it out. You want to compare your thoughts on the drivers with the market assumptions. If you do not know the markets assumptions call up sell side analysts and ask. For DRI, here is the Darden analyst coverage. You do not want to call up analysts and ask their opinion. You are smart enough to form your own opinions. You talk to them to get factual information that you may have trouble getting and for figuring out where the market expectations are. So you have your model, with your drivers, and then you compare it to the markets assumptions and drivers. For example, the consensus EBITDA for FY2010 for DRI is $959M. If your model comes in materially lower than that you would be biased on the short side.

Unfortunately, that is not the only step. How much of this is already priced in? Maybe everyone know the analysts are wrong and that is priced in with low multiples. So now we do our multiple work. I want to compare the multiple to those direct competitors on a current basis, but also on a historical basis. What is the lowest a restaurant similar to Darden has ever traded for? What is the highest multiple ever traded? What is DRI's highest EV/EBIT multiple ever (on a normalized basis)? What is the lowest cash flow multiple it has ever traded for? Etc. If you find a stock where your expectations are significant lower than the market, and the stock is trading at a relatively high multiple to its competitors and its historical range, well that is just a beautiful thing.

You will want to establish a target. We will talk about how we do that on the long / short side in a future post. Also, you want to see if the common stock is the best way to go...maybe you buy the CDS (trading at ~150bps) to get short the company. Or maybe you want to hedge yourself and go long bonds, short common. Again, a great subject for a future post.

This is the general undertaking I do with most common stock investments. Certain situations call for different due diligence practices. I may go further down the rabbit hole for some stocks and less for others. Nonetheless, I love the process. Each time I do it, I try to get better. And each time I learn about a company, I have more information for future investing opportunities.

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4.27.2009

Distressed Debt Exchange - GM

I know we have been pounding the topic of Distressed Debt Exchanges into a pulp on this blog.  But there is a reason for that. They are going to be happening with such frequency in the coming years as levered entities try to "solve" their problems with a coercive exchange (one defined as threatening Chapter 11).  The big news this morning is GM's Debt Exchange. You can find it here: GM Debt Exchange.  I just finished reading the exchange offer.  Here is an executive summary of the press release:

  • Commencing exchange for $27B of unsecured notes
  • Exchange is vital to restructuring out of court
  • 225 shares per $1,000 of bond principal.  
  • Cash will be paid out for accrued interest. According to the press release, USD interest accruals range anywhere from $7.5 per $1000 bonds (less than a 1 point) to $43 per $1000 bonds (4.3 points)
  • If GM does not receive enough exchange by June 1, 2009, will file for bankruptcy
  • Exchange expires 11:59PM, Tuesday May 26th
  • Inserting a call option on non-USD notes
  • Consummation is conditioned upon: Treasury approval (they believe they need 90% of principal to tender to get approval), U.S. Treasury issued 50% of pro forma common stock in exchange for cancellation of at least 50% of GM's outstanding treasury debt and cancellation of the Treasury Warrants, evidence that the Treasury will provide an additional $11.6B of funding that GM believe it will need after May 1st, 2009, VEBA modification (discussed more below), U.S. Treasury and VEBA ownership not more than 89% of Pro Forma stock, binding labor modifications.
Note holders will get 10% of the new GM, existing common will get 1%, and the Treasury and VEBA the balance (exact ratio to be determined). The VEBA negotiations call for GM to issue stock instead of cash for at least 50% of their future obligations to the VEBA (the balance paid in cash).

Bonds are currently trading somewhere around 9 bid, 10 offer. Maybe slightly higher for more liquid issues. The Revolver is trading 50.5-52.5, up a few points from Friday's close, and the Term Loan is trading at 61 bid without, up 3 points from Friday's close.  Obviously the secured lender are liking this deal. The stock is also up - I do not know why though. 

This exchange offer is significantly worse for bondholders than the one being discussed a few weeks back where debtholders would get a substantial portion of the equity. According to press releases, the GM break even point for SAAR would be 10M. Of course, the company is saying this, and you can make your own decision if you want to believe what GM is telling you. 

There was other news on GM today (cutting lots of jobs, phasing out Pontiac, speeding up closing of factories, cutting dealerships by 34%). For more details on these read the WSJ piece

Admittedly, I have nothing positive to say about this plan.  GM should of filed years and years ago.  They've spent ~$145B in capex since 1990 ... AND THEY STILL NEED MORE MONEY TO SURVIVE. They are still going to have 40,000 unionized workers. They are still going to need more tax payer money. They are cancelling tax payer debt in exchange for stock. 

As a bondholder, I really do not know what you should do. If they file, the government is going to surely prime you, and your recovery could be less than ten cents on the dollar where the bonds are trading. The exchanged stock though - how much is that really worth?  I'd be a seller of the bonds at these levels.  I don't want the stock, and I do not like the risks that a bankruptcy brings.

This whole situation is a damn shame.

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Email

hunter [at] distressed-debt-investing [dot] com

About Me

I have spent the majority of my career as a value investor. For the past 8 years, I have worked on the buy side as a distressed debt and high yield investor.