Showing posts with label distressed debt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label distressed debt. Show all posts

10.21.2011

CSFB's Special Situation Conference

Yesterday, CSFB held its annual Special Situation conference. As usual, the event showed me the sheer number of people I have to compete with on a daily basis in distressed land. I saw a run from a CSFB trader that mentioned there were over 700 people in attendance! That's a lot of capital chasing after a fairly small set of opportunities. Nonetheless, I have the utmost respect for the desk analysts at Credit Suisse and think they are some of the best in the business. Because there was a multiple series of tracks going on, I couldn't make it to each of the presentations. With that said, for those that are interested in the names the desks are talking about these days, here are the list of credits that were discussed:


Lightsquared
AMF Bowling
Penton Media
Quiznos
Contech
Spirit
Marsico
Coach America,
Oriental Trading
Cargo 360
Wastequip
Yellow Roadway
Hawker Beechcraft
Vitruvian
US Powergen
Education Media
ATPG
OTE
Norske Skog
Tronox
Harrah's
TXU
Clear Channel
Cengage
Travelport
Eastman Kodak
Lehman Brothers
First Data
EIX

If you were in attendance, and thought one of the presentations was particularly compelling, and would allow me to use your notes (anonymously of course), it would be greatly appreciated. More importantly, I would like to post on each of these names (excluding the ones I/affiliated parties have an interest in) and would love help from other distressed analysts. If you are interested, let me know.

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7.14.2011

Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy

A number of years ago, when I knew nothing about distressed, my portfolio manager sat me down and said, "Our friends at XYZ hedge fund [name redacted] are telling me these Enron bonds are interesting - start working through it." Over the next 6 months I cut my teeth (hard) on figuring out how much bond holders would receive and what return that translated to. It was one of the best exercises that I've ever been put through as an analyst.


In my opinion, the best situations for distressed debt investors to make out-sized returns are when the bankruptcy filing is unexpected. I remember when Solutia filed in 2003 and Parmalat soon after. In both situations, no one had any idea what to make of the situation. Uncertainty creates opportunity. Chaos as it were. In that vein, of every situation I've encountered in my professional career, Lehman, and its various 'flavors' has been one of the most complex.

On a daily basis I am receiving over 200 trader runs on various Lehman instruments. The most liquid of these instruments are the LBHI bonds, or Lehman Brothers' holding company. In addition, you have runs on "LBSF", "LBCS", "LCPI", "LBIE", "LBT", "LBCC", "LOTC", LBHI Euro, LBHI Yen etc etc. While these instruments are more illiquid, each may hold the possibility of a solid risk adjusted return.

Earlier in July, a diverse group of creditors agreed to a settlement that will (more than likely) enable Lehman to exit Chapter 11. Similar to Enron, this settlement resolves around a partial substantive consolidation (80/20) split. This settlement was agreed upon by a "Who's Who" of hedge funds and prop desks (dubbed the PSA Creditors):

Angelo, Gordon & Co., L.P.
Barclays Bank PLC
Barclays Bank S.A.
BNP Paribas
Canyon Capital Advisors LLC
CarVal Investors UK Limited
Contrarian Capital Management LLC
Credit Suisse International
Credit Suisse Loan Funding LLC
Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Limited
Cyrus Capital Partners, L.P.
Davidson Kempner Capital Management LLC
DB Energy Trading LLC
Deutsche Bank AG
Elliott Management Corporation (also Elliott Associates, L.P.
Elliott International, L.P. The Liverpool Limited Partnership)
Fir Tree, Inc.
GLG Ore Hill LLC
Goldentree Asset Management, LP
Goldman Sachs Bank USA
Goldman Sachs International
Hayman Capital Master Fund, L.P.
King Street Capital Management GP, L.L.C.
Knighthead Capital Management, L.L.C.
Morgan Stanley & Co. International PLC
Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc.
Morgan Stanley Capital Services LLC
Mount Kellett Master Fund II, L.P.
Oak Tree Capital Management, L.P.
Och-Ziff Capital Management Group LLC
Paulson & Co. Inc.
Silver Point Capital, L.P.
Societe Generale
Societe Generale Asset Management Banque
Societe Generale Bank and Trust
Taconic Capital Advisors L.P.
The Baupost Group, L.L.C.
The Royal Bank of Scotland plc
Varde Partners, L.P.
York Capital Management Global Advisors, LLC

This group of creditors held over $100 billion (!) of claims against Lehman Brothers.

While the value proposition was definitely there when the LBHI bonds were trading in the teens, another aspect of this case was that A LOT of capital could be put to work with very little correlation to the market with very little downside. And that is still probably the case.

Like in all bankruptcies, the disclosure statement here lays out contemplated recoveries for the various creditor constituencies. And like most bankruptcy cases, these recoveries cannot be relied upon to make actual trading decisions. For instance, LBHI Senior Bonds are contemplated to recover 21.1% whereas in the market as of this afternoon the bonds were trading (depending on the specific bond) between 26 - 26.5%. While in "dollar value" that may not look like a lot, in reality it's a ~25% difference. Why the disparity?
  • As in most cases with financial assets as collateral for creditors, there is a perception that there has been a sense of conservatism and that, over time, these assets throw off cash that increases recoveries to creditors
  • The fact that no one really knows the recovery on foreign inter company receivables. We do know that the recovery of inter company receivables from foreign affiliates, at less than 10% is far below similar (domestic for instance) recoveries contemplated in the disclosure statement - It's also a HUGE number where a 1% bump means $500M more recovered for LBHI
  • Litigation awards that could go any which way
These are just a few factors. In addition, returns to investors depend dramatically on when cash actually gets paid out. The fact that the plan / disclosure statement is on the docket means the likelihood of more timely distributions increases. It will be a sad day when this case finally comes to a close (I believe it accounts for something like 70% of all trade claims).

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12.13.2010

Great Atlantic Bankruptcy (GAP)

Before I begin, I need to correct something I wrote last night introducing the GAP bankruptcy: Rejected lease claims are unsecured claims in a bankruptcy. The GAP 2nd lien notes should be senior to these rejection claims. Chalk it up to lack to sleep. For you real bankruptcy buffs: 502(b)(6) of the Code sets damages at the greater of one year or 15% of the lease (not to exceed three years). Apologies on my part. Net/Net it helped the recovery of the bonds. To note, bonds are up 3-4 points today (went out the day 83-34/flat).


Now to the fun stuff: Great Atlantic announced its decision to file Chapter 11 in the Southern District of NY. To access the docket, you can go here: http://www.kccllc.net/APTea

Now, the DIP is definitely large - but the increased size is to account for taking out existing LOCs and pre-petition bank debt. The DIP will be structured as a $450M RC and a $350M term loan. Pricing is talked at L+750 with a 1.75% Floor. From the docket: "...to secure an $800 million debtor-in possession financing facility, consisting of (i) a $350 million term loan facility to refinance the Debtors’ prepetition senior secured credit facility and provide approximately $187 million in incremental liquidity and (ii) a $450 million revolving facility, including access to a $250 letter of credit sublimit and (b) grant adequate protection to the Debtors’ secured lenders." Essentially, this number was near the upper limit allowed under the pre-petition intercreditor agreement.

As noted in previous posts, one of the most important documents to get yourself associated with a new bankruptcy proceeding is the First Day Affidavit. You can find GAP's here: GAP's First Day Proceedings Affidavit.

A few interesting takeaways from the document:
  • "The Debtors’ primary retail operations consist of supermarkets operated under a variety of well-known trade names, or “banners,” including A&P, Waldbaum’s, SuperFresh, Pathmark, Food Basics, The Food Emporium, Best Cellars, and A&P Liquors. As of September 11, 2010, the Debtors reported total assets of $2.5 billion and liabilities of $3.2 billion. The Debtors currently employ approximately 41,000 employees. "
  • Points out three "significant legacy costs" - Dark store leases, an unfavorable supply agreement with C&S Wholesale (a high yield issuer itself), employee costs (pensions, high labor % of sales)
  • LTM Revenue: $8.4B, down from $9.5B in 2008 and $8.8B in 2009
  • LTM EBITDA and EBITDA Margin: $104M and 1.2% respectively, down dramatically from 2008 of $333M and 3.5% respectively.
  • 95% of employees under collective bargaining agreements (39 separate agreements)
  • Paid $1.4B for Pathmark in 2007
  • "The Debtors’ estimated dark store net rental expense will be $77 million in 2011 alone."
  • Cap Structure:
  • Sames Store Sales down 6.9% YTD
  • Cost Savings Efforts Paying Off: "These initiatives have already generated total cost savings of approximately $40 million on an annualized basis, including over $10 million in annual salary savings"
  • Really putting a lot of blame on C&S through this entire document.
  • $858M of NOLs and $121M in business tax credits
Will be a very entertaining case. Interestingly a few months ago, one Distressed Debt Investors Club member pitched the second liens as a long (they were in the high 60s at the time) right when another member pitched the unsecured bonds as a short. Been a tough ride for 6.75% of 2012:


We will continue monitoring the GAP bankruptcy - think this one could get interesting.

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12.12.2010

One of my favorite pieces of investing from Michael Price

Michael Price is a legendary investor and someone I try to learn from whenever I get the chance. I mean, this is one the guys that taught Seth Klarman how to invest capital. A few years ago, Michael Price gave a speech to Bruce Greenwald's Value Investing course at Columbia Business School. While I do not have the transcript directly in front of me, his words can be summarized as follows: "Read proxies and bankruptcy disclosure statements because they tell you what rational buyers are paying for businesses."


Now this is not theoretical data - i.e. this stock should trade at 6x or 9x - this is a real buyer, with real capital at risk, deploying that capital to buy a certain asset or company. And that information holds value and is very rarely discussed or even analyzed by the sell side.

For those that are interested on Bloomberg, you can make a macro to type in NSE "PREM14 A", and assign that macro to a button and have all the proxies filed at the tip on your hand. For disclosure statements, the process gets a little trickier - you have to monitor the docket to determine when the disclosure statement actually gets filed.

To be sure, many times this information needs to be sensitized relative to company specific factors. For example, I think it would be ludicrous to use most on the run proxy statements to value a distressed company in the same industry. Or if a company is heavily capital intensive versus an asset light company in the same industry - those companies should trade at different multiples because of the ability of the asset light company to better translate EBITDA into real tangible free cash flow. Make sure you are comparing apples to apples here.

Let's take a real world example: On Friday, Great Atlantic said it may file bankruptcy as soon as this weekend. Great Atlantic is always a hot topic among distressed investors. I know many people that bought near dated puts on the company thinking that any rescue effort would fall short. Seemingly it has. Rumors were swirling around the market on Thursday with bonds down 4 or 5 points on the session and then dropping further on Friday.

In January of this year, Penn Traffic, a regional grocer that has filed three times in the past ten years, sold substantially all its assets for $85M to Tops Markets. Here is the disclosure statement: Penn Traffic 2nd Disclosure Statement. According to the Affidavite of the Chief Restructuring Officer:
"Tops proposed a multifaceted transaction pursuant to which it would acquire a substantial number of stores as going concerns with commitments to employ the unionized workers at those stores, act as the Debtors’ liquidation agent with respect to underperforming stores to conduct going out of business sales and liquidate the merchandise in the Debtors’ closing stores, extinguish approximately $72 million of prepetition withdrawal liability claims which otherwise would have been asserted by one of the Debtors’ multi-employer pension funds, and consensually reduce by approximately $27 million the claim of the Debtors’ largest supplier."
Using $85M, and the 2009 financials, this represented ~0.1x revenue, 7.7x adjusted EBITDA. What does this mean for GAP?
  • LTM Revenue is ~$8.5B. Using PTFC's multiple gets you to $850M valuation
  • LTM EBITDA is $100M. Using PTFC's multiple gets you to $770M
***Note - I have edited this section for an error I made last night - score it at "Error - Lack of Sleep" for viewers at home***

But this is where things get tricky. GAP has talked about in previous conference calls there is a $100M cash flow loss from dark store rent. Seemingly in a bankruptcy they could get rid of these leases. There is ~$130M available outstanding on the term loan, ~$140M in cap leases, as well as a plethora of other claims: Long term real estate liabilities, pensions, etc.

Where does this leave us on our $260M of the 11.375% notes. Normalized EBITDA is probably somewhere between $150-$200M after adding back the lease losses. Using $150M and 7.7x multiple gets you to $1.15B in value. Less $130M in term loans, $140M in cap leases gets you to about $900M in value. But given how fast a grocer turns over its inventory as well as a large number of LOCs on the balance sheet, I believe a DIP here will be fairly substantial. For the last 4 years, accounts payable at the 4th quarter is around $200M, so I'll use that. We then have to add in admin expenses. I generally model 2-5% of total debt outstanding depending on the complexity of the case - I'll use 3.5% here which is another $50M of claims.

We are down to $650M in value versus our 11.375% notes. This leads me to believe these bonds are the place to play in the structure - I wish they were lower, but at 80 cents on the dollar, you are getting a decent (albeit possible inadequate) margin of safety here. Other reasons: The 2nd lien notes are guaranteed by the operating subs whereas all other debt (other than credit facility) is not. The bank debt looks to be money good here and seemingly the 11.375% quotes will be the fulcrum security.

We know we have any interested party here: Yucaipa is deeply involved here. Do they step up to take out the fulcrum security to gain control of GAP once and for all? Other things that keep me interested in this case: GAP has a number of brands they could sell to interested parties. While food deflation is all the rage among grocers, I believe this a temporary phenomenon. An investment in GAP's second lien notes may be one of the cheapest ways to play a wave of food inflation over the next few years. And remember, a rational buyer bought similar assets just 10 months ago at the 7.7x valuation - call them crazy if you think I shouldn't be using that multiple. We will continue to monitor this distressed debt case closely in the coming months.

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11.30.2010

Distressed Debt Investing: Systematic Risks

After we announced the hedge fund manager interview series last week, we reached out to one of the first hedge fund managers we interviewed here on Distressed Debt Investing: Peter Lupoff of Tiburon Capital Management (you can find Peter Lupoff's interview here).


With that said, we reached out to Peter to see if he would update us on how the markets have treated him in 2010 as well as any event-driven opportunities he is seeing currently in the market. We will be bringing you that interview early in 2011. Until then though, Peter pointed me to some fantastic resources on systematic risks and how it pertains to event driven and hedge fund asset allocation.

The first resource is an interview Peter did with Bloomberg News. You can view the interview here: Peter Lupoff on "Inside Track"

The second is a presentation Peter gave at a Fed/FMA Session on Systemic Risk in October:


And finally, Peter has penned an amazing piece entitled, "Systemic Risk – Curing the Disease and Killing the Patient" which can be found at Tiburon Capital's website here: Systemic Risk – Curing the Disease and Killing the Patient

Enjoy!


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11.02.2010

Greenlight Capital: 3rd Quarter 2010 Letter

Greenlight Capital released their 3rd Quarter 2010 letter (courtesy of Dealbreaker) which you can see here: Greenlight Capital's 3rd Quarter 2010 Letter.


Outside of the fantastic commentary on the eventual failure of QE2 to actually accomplish anything substantial (a position I strongly agree with), one of the most interesting things I took away from the letter was Greenlight's activity in distressed debt.

In the letter, Greenlight points out that they purchased the debt and equity of ATP Oil & Gas, a recent favorite of many members of the distressed debt community. As an example, in June, two members of the Distressed Debt Investors Club both pitched the ATP debt as longs with sizable return potential. How have those bonds done since June? Pretty well:


What happened here. Let me see if I can give you a quick run-down of the situation:
  • Deep water drilling moratorium enacted in the Gulf due to the BP spill - a 6 month halt on drilling could cost lots of money for ATP as 60% of their reserves are located in deepwater GOM. That combined with a heavy capex program - people begin to worry about the future cash flow potential of this company. People even begin to mention a possibly bankruptcy due to a cash crunch. Sell side starts downgrading en masse (i.e. time to start looking at it as a long)
  • Bonds continue to weaken. On the 8th of June, bonds are down 4-6 points in thin trading. Reason: The purported second leak that didn't actually exist. A downgrade to CCC+ did not help either.
  • Bonds start moving higher as rumors that the drilling moratorium on deep water drilling could end sooner. Stock moving 10-15% a day up also seemed to help.
  • Louisiana judge lifts ban - bonds shoot up - felt like a short squeeze really as bonds felt heavy post.
  • ATP place a new $150M term loan (with an option to extend to $500M). Market begins to start pricing ATP as a going concern versus a liquidation (despite the possible increased priming)
  • Bonds weaken as representatives from the House begin discussing the $75M liability cap (i.e. insurance would be prohibitively expensive for someone like ATP) and a new moratorium is put into place.
  • Bonds move up on no volume/news until ATP releases disappointing 2Q numbers - then bonds move down on substantial volume
  • Beginning of September there was rumors on another rig explosion: One bold trader made a 75-80 market.
  • Bonds begin to drift higher on seemingly no news. Then company announces a $350M TL to monetize ATP Titan. Bonds continue to move higher.
  • Rumors that the deepwater drilling ban will end early keeps the bonds moving higher still. Sell side starts to get bullish again - i.e. time to possibly lock in some gains.
  • 2nd Telemark Hub begins production. Bonds and stock continue to climb.
  • More rumors about the lift in the drilling moratorium. Bonds and stock climb further.
  • Moratorium conditionally lifted - bonds go bid without (no sellers) in the mid 90s.
That takes us to about 2-3 weeks ago. There has been some positive and negative news since and bonds went out wrapped around 90 this afternoon.

During this entire timeline though, the company could have received at least $500M of assets for the Titan assets, had spent significant amounts of capital at both the Telemark and Gomez wells, had ~90MMbbl of Gulf of Mexico Reserves, and ~40M of North Sea Reserves, and nearly $300M of cash. Using sensible numbers, you could make a case for $2B for these assets vs. $1.65B of 1st lien and 2nd lien debt (before Titan monetization). Yes - you could have made the argument that GOM drilling was done for eternity, but then I would have called you crazy. It was a temporary problem that, yes, could have dragged on, but maybe to the detriment of $250M-$500M of ATP's value - still nearly covering the 2nd liens.

The above timeline shows you a typical distressed situation - sometimes they work out and other times they do not. As noted above and in previous posts, you have to compare how much your assets can be monetized for versus the claims against them. When the ATP bonds dropped to 70%, at market, there was about $1.2B of claims versus the aforementioned $2B of value - in my opinion, a pretty attractive margin of safety. If the moratorium had lasted into 2011, the company would have filed, and the bonds would have gone lower, but at the end of the day, the asset value would still be there and returns to the 2nd lien bonds may have been greater as they would have been the fulcrum security. Quite an interesting story indeed.

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9.30.2010

Michael Tennenbaum's Interview on Distressed Debt


In an interview on Bloomberg News, Michael Tennenbaum, founder of Tennenbaum Capital Partners, presented his thoughts on the current state of the distressed debt market. (Interview video embedded below). In addition, Bloomberg held it's Dealmaker's Summit, which I will also report on later today / tomorrow (lots of fantastic speakers)

Here are some of my thoughts / biggest take-aways from the interview:
  • Talks about the 1.2 trillion of debt coming due over the next five years (200 billion due in the next two years). With so much of that in lower rated credits, thinks default cycle will pick up - something I am very much in agreement on.
  • Distressed debt for control is complex and thus less competition and thus better entry valuation points - something Seth Klarman has discussed repeatedly as it related to distressed debt
  • Points out that Tennenbaum is a "rescuer, not a shark." Tennenbaum historically has been very active in the DIP space - a space that is getting very crowded right now.
  • B rated issued default at a 15% cumulative rate over 3 years. Lots of B rated issue now and last year. More opportunities coming down the pipe.
  • Interviewer correctly notes that the overall credit market's gain is really not the best thing for distressed debt investors - Not exactly right: A healthy credit market means easier exit facility financings and generally higher valuations on exits if that sort of thing is the way you will play a particular case (see: Six Flags).
  • Tennenbaum notes that middle market issuers are having issues coming to market. What about all the funds whose sole purpose is to do that sort of thing? Highbridge for instance has a fund whose main purpose is lending to middle market issuers. That being said - that has been a GREAT business to be in the last year.
  • Outlook for economy: Poor - no real drivers. Muddle along as John Mauldin would say.
Overall great interview. I have worked alongside and across the table from the guys at Tennenbaum Capital - incredibly smart group of people. Will try to post more on them in the future.

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9.15.2010

One of the best pieces of investment advice I've ever read.

We have extensively covered the wisdom and writings of Oaktree's Howard Marks on the blog. In his most recent commentary, Marks puts into words quite possibly the greatest piece of investment advice I have ever read:

"At What Price?

That question - at what price? - isn't just the right question to ask about bonds versus stocks today. It's the right question regarding every investment at every point in time.

I try every chance I get to convince people that in investing, there's no such thing as a good idea...or a bad idea. Anything can be a good idea at one price and time, and a bad one at another."
He continues with quotes from letters, reiterating the same point:
"It has been demonstrated time and time again that no asset is so good that it can't become a bad investment if bought at too high a price. And there are few assets so bad that they can't be a good investment when bought cheap enough ... No asset class or investment has the birthright of a high return. It's only attractive if it's priced right."
Seth Klarman has made similar points:
"Risk is not inherent in an investment; it is always relative to price paid. Uncertainty is not the same as risk. Indeed, when great uncertainty - such as in the Fall of 2008 - drive security prices to especially low levels, they often become less risk investments."
And Warren Buffett with his famous:
"The future is never clear; you pay a very high price in the stock market for a cheery consensus. Uncertainty is the friend of the buyer of long-term values."
All three quotes lay out the same principle: Price is what matters.

When I hear friends talk about how terrible an investment idea is, I always pose the question: At what price would you buy this security?

In Howard Mark's aforementioned recent letter (found here) he discusses the current state of the credit markets. In a previous post on Distressed Debt Investing ("Credit Markets Quite Possibly Insane"), I talked about what was going on in the investment grade and high yield markets. Then things were getting nutty.

The last few days have convinced me credit investors have lost their minds (again).

On Bloomberg, their is a function - It is essentially what is going on in the new issue monitor in the credit space. The last three days have been the busiest I can remember in the primary space (across investment grade, high yield, and bank debt). Worse, all in yields are remarkably low and more and more dividend deals are getting announced. I do not think there is a second lien dividend deal out there (my indicator for "Sell Everything"), but I may have missed it given the enormity of the primary market.

Yes - I understand the argument - "Where else am I going to get yield?" But from the same people that asked the EXACT same question in February 2007. Dealers fuel the flame because when credit markets roar, bankers / traders / syndicate gets paid.

Maybe I have talked about this in past posts, but what really scares me is how fast the credit markets have changed from boom, bust, boom, bust this year. Yes, high yield is up 10%, but most of that is the curve tightening. The HY14 CDX Spread:


Look at that chart from January 1st, 2010. Spreads widen, spreads collapse, spreads wide, spreads collapse. Does this look like a healthy market to anyone? If investors started worrying more about price (spreads in credit land), versus chasing yield, this market would feel less insane. Alas, reach for yield continues, unabated - I hear the forward calendar continues to grow as CFO and treasurers RACE to beat the window of cheap debt issuance.

Who is going to be that last buyer who get's stuck holding the bag of the worst issuers? Tread carefully.

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9.10.2010

Distressed Debt Investing interviews Mark Berman

We are very excited to bring you an interview with Mark Berman, founder and Managing Partner of MB Family Advisors, LLC and the MB Dislocation Opportunity Fund, L.P., a dislocation / distressed credit fund-of-funds. MB Family Advisors, LLC is a multi-family office investment firm founded in 2008 to manage investment portfolios for ultra-high net worth families across asset class, with a particular focus on alternative investments and investing in inefficient markets.


Mark will be speaking at the upcoming Global Forum on Investing in Distressed Debt, coming up this month in NYC. If you remember, this is an event I have helped to organize. I really hope all my readers will attend.

Enjoy the interview!


Mark - Could you give us a little bit of background on yourself and MB Family Advisors?

Sure. In a former life I started my career as an M&A attorney at Skadden, Arps but I’ve been a principal investor since 1994, mostly in firms where I was a Founder or Co-Founder and invested substantial personal capital alongside my investors. Initially I focused on small and mid-market buyout investing and had some great success as well as luck (for instance our marquee buyout transaction generated a return of almost 60x our equity investment). I started investing in hedge funds in 1997, both single manager and fund-of-funds. In 2001, seeing the inefficiencies in the private equity secondary market I co-founded a fund firm that purchased in the secondary market limited partnership interests in real estate private equity funds. The common theme to my investing career has been to focus on finding inefficient markets where a provider of scarce capital can generate outsized returns.

The search for inefficient markets required that I develop deep experience across multiple asset classes – private equity, hedge funds, credit markets, real estate etc. This broad experience led to the launch of MB Family Advisors, LLC in mid-2008 when I formalized a relationship with an anchor investor to manage his family’s investment portfolio across asset class. The anchor investor has a low 9-figure net worth. The intention has been that over time I would add additional family clients and on occasion offer specialized investment products that could opportunistically target particularly inefficient opportunities.

The first investment product came in January 2009 when I launched the MB Dislocation Opportunity Fund, LP, a dislocation/distressed credit fund-of-funds. The Fund is intended to provide investors with diverse exposure across a variety of different credit, distressed and other niche strategies including traditional long/short corporate distressed; asset based lending; structured credit; merger arbitrage; and mortgage debt markets (RMBS/CMBS & whole loans), among other strategies. The common denominator in all the Fund’s allocations is that we invest in strategies positioned to benefit from ways the capital markets have changed since the 2008 financial crisis.


We have to say, a January 2009 launch of a distressed credit fund-of-funds seems incredibly prescient. When you were looking out at the world at that time, why did you think that was the opportune time to invest?

Well, for starters I’d note that it’s more of a “dislocation” fund than pure distressed credit. As indicated, we’ll invest in any strategy we think has benefited from the 2008 financial crisis. Distressed debt is just one of the underlying strategies.

As for timing of the Fund’s launch, as I alluded to I think the best investment opportunities come from inefficient markets. As capital markets imploded in the Fall of 2008 credit markets in particular became so highly dislocated. Credit completely froze. While there was substantial continuing uncertainty regarding the severity of the recession it was already clear by year-end 2008 that the US and other developed country governments would not allow the complete collapse of the financial system. However, the complete lack of liquidity and fear associated with uncertainty created forced and/or highly motivated sellers resulting in substantially mis-priced securities and assets.

The mis-pricing existed across multiple markets including leveraged loans, ABS, DIP lending, ABL lending and others where all of a sudden you could target high, equity like returns or better investing at the most senior, least risky part of the capital structure. I wanted in on that action.

To get sufficient diversity of strategy and manager I decided to launch the fund-of-funds and take in outside investor capital. In hindsight our timing was good. It’s still early but we’ve enjoyed great success thus far and have generated positive returns in 18 of the 20 months since launch.


We see you have had tremendous success to date - What are your thoughts on the distressed market today? Do you worry that so much capital has entered the space over the past 12 months that returns going forward could be squeezed out?

The nature of the opportunity set has changed. Initially the opportunity existed to get 20%+ returns on high quality, performing assets that were not distressed but were trading at distressed prices. That trade is over.

For reasons I’ll describe, over the next 12-18 months I think there are other niche strategies more compelling than distressed corporate debt. However, there are attractive opportunities currently in some mid-market distressed names and beginning in late 2011 or early 2012 the overall distressed market will become extremely compelling again.

To me it’s clear that we’re in the midst of what will be a multi-year distressed cycle. The upcoming wall of debt maturities has over $1 Trillion in corporate debt coming due (and this excludes mortgage debt), much of which was issued in the go go years of 2005-07 and is stuck in unsustainable capital structures. Sure, “amend and extend” has kicked the can down the road but for many of these companies the day of reckoning will nevertheless come. At that point there will be a huge supply/demand imbalance in favor of distressed debt investors and 20%+ return potential will exist again.

Several high yield analysts have recently opined that all the debt extensions are solving the wall of debt maturity problem but I think they are misguided. High yield issuance is at record levels but something like 70% - 80% of the issuance has been for tenders to replace existing debt and extend out maturities. Yes, this has resulted in default rates coming way down for large cap companies that can access the high yield market. It’s true that this makes the distressed opportunity set much less attractive in the near term --say over the next 12-18 months -- but this is a temporary phenomenon. While you can solve a liquidity problem with more debt you generally can’t solve a balance sheet problem by issuing more debt unless growth is so robust that substantially higher cash flow can meaningfully shrink leverage and coverage ratios. (Unfortunately this is a lesson our government hasn’t yet learned but that’s a topic for another day.) The prospects for this type of hyper growth in cash flow are quite slim.

So, in the near term there will be fewer large on-the-run names in the distressed space and returns will be squeezed but with a little patience distressed debt will be quite compelling again. In any case, it’s important to appreciate that through Q2 of this year default rates for small and mid-cap companies were still in excess of 10%. These companies do not have access to the high yield market and have far fewer options to kick the can down the road. Therefore, in my view the most attractive distressed opportunities for the next year or two will be in the mid-market. This is an important consideration when assessing who to allocate distressed capital to.

Perhaps that’s a lot to digest but the bottom line is that I think (A) over the next 12-18 months there is more opportunity in other niche credit strategies like direct and asset based lending, (B) within distressed the best opportunities in the next 12-18 months are going to be in mid-market names and (C) as the day of reckoning on the wall of debt maturities gets closer, the overall distressed market will become extremely compelling again and offer 20%+ potential returns.


When you are looking to allocate capital to a manager, what do you look for? Do you tend to allocate across smaller funds or larger funds?

We take a portfolio approach so it’s very important the individual component allocations fit together well. To some extent this means limiting correlation among underlying managers, each of whom has to bring something different to make it into our portfolio. We intentionally have a mix of small and large funds. Generally speaking our bias is for funds that use no or limited leverage; that don’t have 2008 legacy problems either in their portfolio or business; and have a stable underlying capital base.

With regard to individual manager decisions, like most allocators it’s important for us to understand what the particular manager’s “edge” is and get comfortable with the manager’s superior talent, ability to source ideas, integrity, commitment to best practices in back office and reporting, and passion generally for what they do.

In addition, three super important hot buttons for us are (i) interest alignment, (ii) risk management and (iii) world class investment process. If we aren’t 100% comfortable with these issues then nothing else matters. I’d note that process generally is under-appreciated among many investors. Great results come out of great process, period. We’re much more focused on seeing a rigorous, disciplined and repeatable process than we are on recent historical performance.


Continuing on allocation, when looking at your group of portfolio managers in which you have invested, how do you determine which manager will get the next dollar of your investor's capital? Does it depend on the underlying portfolio manager's strategies?

Yes, strategy is critical. Going forward I believe the best investors will distinguish themselves by being in the right strategies, as the environment will be ripe to reward certain strategies and punish others. While there’s no substitute for talent and motivation, a B+ manager in a strategy with substantial wind at its back will substantially outperform an A+ manager in a strategy with headwinds. I am extremely attuned to this in portfolio construction and it does heavily influence the allocation of incremental investment dollars.

It also drives occasional redemption decisions. Early this year I redeemed from a credit fund that generated net returns of 45% in 2009. It was a difficult decision in that the manager was talented and had really delivered for us. However, it was a long-only fund focused on a particular segment of the credit markets. That segment had rallied so substantially to the point that the opportunity set going forward no longer presented a compelling risk-reward profile– so I redeemed.

The other consideration that’s also critical is liquidity. Different funds have different lock-up and notice requirements and, at least in managing the Dislocation Fund, we have to make sure we don’t risk an asset/liability mis-match. This is less important in managing the family office portfolios but even there you want to make sure you are being compensated if you’re giving up liquidity.


Among the strategies in which you allocate capital (traditional long/short corporate distressed; DIP lending; merger arbitrage; asset based lending; fixed income arbitrage; asset backed securities; structured finance; and mortgage debt markets), where do you see the most opportunity today? The least opportunity?

Our strategy allocations are driven by the broad thesis that the dislocation experienced since the 2008 financial crisis will persist for multiple years, creating both opportunities (and risks). There are three primary drivers of our opportunity set:
(1) The wall of debt maturities – as discussed earlier there is over $1 trillion of high yield debt and leveraged loans coming due (nearly $4 trillion if you include mortgage debt). Much of this will eventually need to be restructured which feeds classic distressed debt investment strategies;

(2) The availability of capital is highly bifurcated: for companies large enough to tap high yield, credit is widely available -- but for companies with less than $50M in EBITDA and those looking for asset based loans credit is still extremely scarce. This creates opportunity for those managing direct lending and ABL funds to invest at the most senior, least risky top of capital structure but still get high equity like returns; and

(3) Certain strategies are positioned to benefit from the deleveraging because far less capital is chasing the spreads. An example of this would be low risk merger arbitrage where spreads are materially higher than what they were a few years ago because prop desks have shrunken and hedge funds have far less leverage available.
Over the next 12-18 months I think the most attractive strategies fall out of the 2nd and 3rd drivers – i.e. those that can be a provider of scarce capital and/or those benefiting from deleveraging. In particular I think direct lending, asset based lending and merger arbitrage are quite attractive right now – offering the potential to generate equity like returns without equity risk. In addition to the attractive return profile, if executed properly they are relatively low risk and, importantly, come with little or no correlation to the public equity or fixed income markets.

We know many emerging distressed and credit hedge fund managers will be attending the IQPC Global Forum on Distressed Debt coming up in September. We know many smaller managers have difficulty attracting the attention of fund of funds. Could you shed some light on things emerging managers could improve to better attract outside investor capital?

Fundraising is difficult for emerging managers. In my view the best positioned emerging managers are those with a differentiated strategy. If it’s not differentiated the bar is so much higher as new funds do have higher business and operational risk.

That said, the data is clear that as AUM increases manager returns decrease. Emerging managers could do a better job of highlighting this data – it’s strange but I don’t see it that often in emerging manager pitch books. Many talk about their ability to focus on off the run names but don’t necessarily draw the cause and effect relationship supported by empirical data. Good allocators should already be aware of this but I think emerging managers would be well served by highlighting it more. Emerging managers that are committed to capping AUM at a certain size for a defined period of time may also send a message to investors that they are more focused on generating high returns than on high fees.

Of course, in today’s environment an emerging manager has to be committed to best practices with respect to back office, operational and reporting functions. Operational due diligence has taken on a heightened level of importance and it’s easy to say no to a good investor with only mediocre controls. This can be challenging for an emerging manager who has less resources than a larger fund but nevertheless the emerging manager needs to demonstrate this commitment if they want to attract institutional capital. Likewise, having a highly credible Administrator, Auditor and Prime Broker is also important.

Finally, for me interest alignment is critical with all managers but even more so for an emerging manager. That means it’s often a non-starter if a substantial majority of the manager’s net worth isn’t invested in their fund. You take a little bit of a leap with any emerging manager but can get a higher level of comfort if the manager has a larger investment than you do in his or her fund and is essentially managing their own capital and you’re along for the ride.

When we do invest with an emerging manager we’ll generally start small and build the relationship over time.


You have been incredibly successful in setting up a number of investment partnerships. What is next for you?

Never say never, and I suppose it’s possible the umbrella I operate under could change, but at this point it’s hard to see me doing anything else. This is an incredibly fascinating time to be an investor. The investment landscape has changed dramatically since the 2008 financial crisis. There are so many opportunities and so many landmines, and the intellectual exercise of navigating that balance is more challenging and rewarding than anything I’ve done professionally to-date. I love how I spend my days. The challenges and uncertainty also place a higher premium on talent, which I hope accrues to my benefit.

Read more...

9.08.2010

Advanced Distressed Debt Lesson - Equitable Subordination

One of the best things about the Distressed Debt Investors Club is the collective knowledge of a group of very strong analysts and portfolio managers that have trafficked in a number of very complicated bankruptcy proceedings. No two bankruptcy cases are exactly alike. For various reasons (judges, capital structure and guarantees, covenants, outside interest), the chips can fall in a number of different ways in the same bankruptcy proceeding. The bankruptcy code and each of its articles can be interpreted differently by numerous parties. It is what makes distressed debt investing so fascinating.


With that said, DDIC member Paul has penned a piece for us on equitable subordination. Given the complexities of capital structures that have evolved over the past cycle, it is a crucial concept for distressed investors to understand. Enjoy

Equitable Subordination

Analyses of distressed investments often range from the relatively straightforward to the mind numbingly complex. For investments in companies with a simple capital structure, investors will focus on factors such as cash flows, collateral value and terms of the governing credit document.

In larger, more complex companies, investors might have to analyze many additional issues involving restricted and non-subsidiaries, guarantees, security, baskets, carve outs, and covenants, just to name a few. When a company files for bankruptcy protection, additional considerations arise requiring an understanding of the bankruptcy code. One of these considerations involves equitable subordination.

Equitable subordination is a doctrine outlined in Article 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. The language from the Code states that equitable subordination allows a court to “subordinate for purposes of distribution” all or part of an allowed claim to another allowed claim when equitable principles require. Interestingly, the Bankruptcy Code does not provide guidance on when equitable subordination should apply. The Court, instead, typically relies on a standard created by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit involving three conditions:
  1. Inequitable conduct by the claimant
  2. Misconduct causing injury to creditors or the bankruptcy estate or conferring an unfair advantage to the claimant
  3. The finding of equitable subordination must be consistent with bankruptcy law
Distressed investors should bear in mind a few additional principles when evaluating potential equitable subordination issues. One is these issues involves the distinction between an insider and non-insider. An insider’s conduct is subject to a higher level of scrutiny than the conduct of a non-insider. Another issue involves the application of remedies in equitable subordination cases. In equitable subordination Orders, the Court will offset the harm suffered by creditors on account of inequitable, or unfair conduct. The Court, however, will not necessarily subordinate the full value of a claim as part of the remedy.

Equitable subordination is frequently alluded to in bankruptcy cases by investors who have witnessed a steep fall in the value of their securities. Courts, however, do not often find that questionable tactics prior to a bankruptcy filing meet the high standard of egregious misconduct required in equitable subordination cases. A recent exception to this rule of thumb is Yellowstone Mountain Club, a bankruptcy filing in the District of Montana. In this case, Debtor and the creditor committee claimed that a secured loan in the amount of $375 mm constituted a fraudulent transfer. Without getting bogged down in the legal details of the case, the Court ruled in favor of the Debtor and creditor committee, finding that the lender’s actions “were so far overreaching and self serving that they shocked the conscience of the Court.” As a remedy, the Court subordinated the lender’s secured claim to the claims of unsecured creditors in the case.

With a robust understanding of equitable subordination, distressed investors should tread carefully as they evaluate purchasing senior securities that may have unfairly disadvantaged junior securities in a capital structure.

Read more...

7.12.2010

Tronox: Distressed Debt Re-Visited

In January, Distressed Debt Investing did a post on the distressed debt of Tronox. For a reference, here is the trading chart of the Tronox 9.5% due 2012.




And the original underlying thesis of the post:
Investment Idea Synopsis
  • Recommend purchase of 9.5% Senior Unsecured Notes (Ticker: TRX) at 75 and subscribing to rights offering at $10.40 per share a 40% discount to implied market value.
  • Recommend purchase of L+700 bp (2% LIBOR Floor) DIP/Exit Facility at approximately 96(W/OID) at syndication.
As of today, the Tronox bonds are trading 77/79. On July 7th, they were trading in the upper 90s. What gives?

Like most bankruptcies, Tronox's plan of reorganization has gone through a number of revisions. Here is the press release of the most recent change:
OKLAHOMA CITY, July 8 /PRNewswire-FirstCall/ -- Tronox Incorporated (Pink Sheets: TRXAQ, TRXBQ), on behalf of itself and its affiliated debtors and debtors in possession (collectively, "Tronox") announced today that it has filed a Plan of Reorganization and the accompanying Disclosure Statement with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the "Bankruptcy Court"), where Tronox's Chapter 11 cases are currently pending.

The Plan contains the framework of agreements Tronox is formulating with its principal creditors — the United States government, several states, its unsecured creditors' committee, various tort claimants and its equity committee — and is premised upon the transfer of Tronox's legacy environmental
and tort liability to certain trusts to be funded upon Tronox's emergence from
bankruptcy.

Under the Plan:

* Newly created government trusts responsible for environmental remediation at properties located throughout the United States will be funded with a package of consideration that includes (i) up to $145 million in cash, (ii) 88% of Tronox's interest in pending litigation against Anadarko Petroleum Corporation and Kerr-McGee Corporation (the "Anadarko Litigation"), (iii) preferred stock and warrants convertible to common equity of Reorganized Tronox, allowing the trusts to share the benefit of improvements in Tronox's enterprise value, and (iv) certain other real
property, insurance and financial assurance assets.

* Tort claims will be satisfied through separate trusts funded with 12% of the Anadarko Litigation proceeds, $7 million in cash and certain insurance assets. If tort claimants vote to reject the Plan, they will share in the general unsecured pool and Tronox will retain 12% of the Anadarko Litigation and the $7 million in cash.

* General Unsecured Claims (including claims held by the company's prepetition noteholders) are slated to receive all of the primary common equity of Reorganized Tronox. Tronox expects general unsecured creditors will recover between 80 and 100% of their claims based on plan valuation.

* Existing equity holders will recover warrants to purchase up to 5% of the common equity (subject to certain terms and conditions) if they vote to accept the Plan.

"The filing of the Plan is a key milestone for Tronox as it focuses on emerging from Chapter 11. We believe the plan contains the elements necessary to achieve a consensual settlement of our environmental and other legacy liabilities," said Tronox Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Dennis Wanlass. "Importantly, the Plan would enable Tronox to emerge from Chapter 11 as a going concern, responsibly capitalized and well positioned to ensure its long-term viability for the benefit of all stakeholders — including the environmental trusts and agencies responsible for serving the public
interest."

Wanlass stated: "We are pleased to be able to propose a fair and comprehensive package to the government while still achieving substantial recoveries for all of our other creditor groups. While there is much work ahead, the end of this complex bankruptcy is in sight and we will continue to work closely with our stakeholders in an effort to garner their support for the plan before voting
begins. We thank our customers, suppliers, business partners and employees for their ongoing commitment to the company through this process, which has helped us to build a stronger Tronox."

The hearing to consider approval of the Disclosure Statement that explains Tronox's plan is scheduled for August 5, 2010.

Copies of the Plan and Disclosure Statement can be found under the "Reorganization" section of Tronox's website at www.tronox.com . The Plan is subject to receiving the requisite votes from stakeholders, receiving approval from the Bankruptcy Court and satisfying closing conditions. The Plan is subject to change.
Let's parse this. They are creating a trust. This trust will deal with environmental and tort liability, as well as remediation. And this trust will be funded with recoveries that were intended to go to bond holders. The initial plan had these same litigation trusts funded with a $105M rights offering and $10M of cash on hand. As can be seen above, they are getting a lot more than that. Research reports indicate that the delta between the initial plan and the most recent plan was that a number of cities and states were not "in" on the first round of negotiations and thus as these guys became party to the discussion, more stakeholders wanted a larger piece of the pie.

To top all this off, the company has noted that if the Tort Claimants reject the plan, recoveries may be materially lower. Why? Ff the Class 4 tort claims reject the plan, they could be included in the general unsecured claim basket. This is bad for the bonds. Terribly bad for the bonds. Why? Current unsecured claims number about $475M. But from the various bankruptcy filings we know that the tort claims amount to over $2 billion! Of course some of these will be rejected, and worked down, but this creates even more uncertainty.

It is getting late, but tomorrow I will lay out a bearish and a bullish case for the bonds. If you can't wait that long, the still like the DIP facility, which, in our opinion is well covered in all scenarios, trades in the 101 context, boasts a decently fat coupon, and will collect exit fees ALONG with possible amendment / extension fees if this bankruptcy drags on.

Read more...

Distressed Debt Opportunities

Good article on distressed debt opportunities in Financial News. I have pasted the article below...

Distressed debt funds queue for opportunities

Phil Craig

12 Jul 2010

Jumping in near the top of the market goes against almost every rule in the book. But distressed debt managers are expecting investors to do just that. They are preparing for substantial inflows even though hints of another recession suggest asset prices could be set to fall.

Weak economic data, such as the US non-farm payroll data released this month, which showed a 125,000 decline in jobs in June, the largest fall since October, suggests a “double-dip” recession is growing more likely, say investors and companies. A survey published last week by accountancy firm Deloitte found that chief financial officers at 125 UK companies believe there is a 38% chance of a double-dip recession.

Distressed debt funds made 30% last year, according to data provider HedgeFund.net, and rose a further 7% in the first half of this year. Managers of distressed debt funds already took hundreds of millions of dollars into their strategies in 2010.

An economic downturn would cause the prices of distressed assets to fall, implying losses for distressed debt funds. Losses can be substantial. In 2008, this class of fund lost 27%, according to HedgeFund.net. Investors might be expected to pull money away from the funds and avoid the sector until they feel sure that any recession has passed its lowest point.

But fears of an economic downturn are making managers more optimistic, not less. Distressed debt funds typically have extended lock-in periods, minimising risks of substantial short-term withdrawals. Moreover, they believe that slowing growth will spur investors to place even more money in the asset class, as more distressed opportunities come to the fore.

Iain Burnett, head of distressed debt at BlueBay Asset Management, which manages $1.6bn (€1.3bn) of such assets, said: “Over the last 12 months, maybe $2bn or $3bn have flowed into distressed debt as a whole, but I would expect a much higher figure over the next year. It will be a combination of investors understanding that we are in a stage of the cycle where there will be very good returns, and that the outlook is not so good for other asset classes.

“The opportunity is defined largely by the leverage pumped in during 2007. There are hundreds of billions of potentially distressed situations out there. This is the distressed debt opportunity of a lifetime.”

Paul Taylor, head of restructuring at M&G Investments, said: “Our view is that there will be an abundance of opportunities in the coming years, and we are putting the work in now.”

He highlighted four reasons for expecting an oversupply of distressed debt: a persistently weak economic backdrop; limited credit available for refinancing; “sticking plaster” refinancings enacted in 2008 that need to be restructured; and a wave of approaching maturities over the next few years. He said real estate debt provided particularly good opportunities, as few debt investors specialise in the area.
Investors have been placing money with distressed debt managers in recent months.

BlueBay launched its second distressed debt fund, focused on Europe, last December. Alchemy Partners has taken commitments of more than £280m (€335m) for its latest distressed debt fund focused on Europe and is targeting £500m, and OakTree Capital Management is preparing to raise its third fund focused on Europe this year, according to sources familiar with the two companies. Other managers that have closed European distressed debt funds this year include Intermediate Capital Group and Apollo, according to data provider Preqin.

Why not delay an investment until any second economic dip has begun? Andrew Kirton, global head of investment consulting at Mercer, highlighted distressed debt as a good opportunity for investors in early 2009 and said Mercer’s view had not changed. He said: “There’s a danger of catching the falling knife. Clearly, there is risk involved. But if you are building a diversified portfolio of distressed debt, you will be able to withstand a certain default rate. I remember back in the early 1990s when some managers were buying property debt at 40 cents in the dollar. It took five years, but they made a lot of money for investors.”

Damien Miller, global head of special situations at distressed debt specialist Alcentra, said: “It is possible that less sophisticated investors will retrench due to fear, as many did during 2009. The more sophisticated investors will increase allocations to distressed funds on the back of the inevitable increase in the size of the opportunity that a double dip brings. We have already started to see this.”

Miller said a pull-back in flows should, on balance, be a net positive for the overall return opportunity in the asset class. He said: “Any interruption to supply and demand for an asset class will serve to create assets or investment opportunities which are mispriced – there is no better example of this than leveraged loans during 2009. We like to pursue actively investments in assets which we believe are mispriced because we think we are able to value them better than other market participants.”

Ken Kinsey-Quick, head of multi-manager alternative investments at London boutique Thames River, which runs a fund of funds investing in distressed assets, said: “I think most investors are committed to this space. If anything, we have seen people thinking about adding assets.”

There is a fly in the ointment. A weakening economic backdrop could lead banks, which still hold substantial loans on their balance sheets, to avoid selling them, according to BlueBay’s Burnett. He said: “One of the key drivers for distressed debt is that we need banks to start selling their problem corporate loans.

“They haven’t done it yet on any significant scale, and we would like to see the banks making big profits, which would give them cover to sell bad loans at a loss. But a double dip would be bad for banks’ earnings, meaning they might put off selling bad loans.”

However, a senior executive at a rival asset manager, who declined to be named, said other factors could offset such worries: “It is possible that a bigger driver for banks’ behaviour will be a liquidity crisis. If the European Central Bank stops providing short-term liquidity, the banks will have to shed their assets to avoid the refinancing risk.”

Read more...

6.28.2010

ACAS and the Distressed Debt Investors Club Update

I wanted to give all our readers a quick update on the Distressed Debt Investors Club. Each week we are getting more and more member and guest application and we could not be any happier with the growth and progress of the site. Throughout the second half of the year I plan on devoting a significant amount of resources to expand the functionality and membership of the site. Currently we have nearly 1500 guests and 140 members. As mentioned in previous posts, the membership for the site closes when we get to 250 members so I encourage those that are interested to apply - you get access to all the previous posted ideas and the Distressed Debt Investors Club forum, a place where I am posting 2 to 3 times a day.


With that, and I try to do this once every few months, I provide you with a recent idea submitted to the site: American Capital (ACAS) [Note - All attachments have not been included in the below write-up. You will just have to join the site to get the 17 page supporting attachment]

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Investment Thesis
ACAS is potentially undervalued relative to the fair value ("FV") of its investment portfolio and its earnings potential as measured by NOI. Meaningfully more leveraged than its peers, ACAS is currently going through a balance sheet restructuring. In the past management was able to leverage the business through issuance of on-balance sheet unsecured obligations-- a capital structure strategy that is unsustainable given the volatility of the underlying assets. The reorganization plan calls for the use of the company's large cash position to pay down debt and exchange unsecured debt for secured issues. More equity has been raised (including appx. 58mm shares 75% of which was sold to Paulson & Co. -- on appx. 280 mm existing) Additionally, in the future, management hopes to sustain leverage through securitization trusts, which has been a successful source of low-cost funds in the past.

There are several catalysts that may realize value in the short term/medium term:
(1) Finalization of the exchange offer/presentation by management with PF-capital structure and business projections.
(2) Continued realization of its current investment portfolio at or greater than FV.
(3) Eventual reinstatement of the dividend on a cash basis.
(4) Mark up of European subsidiary European Capital "ECAS."

Business Model
ACAS is a business development company "BDC," a form of publicly traded private equity vehicle in the United States. Historically, in the United States, there had been a group of publicly traded private equity firms that were registered as business development companies (BDCs) under the Investment Company Act of 1940.

Typically, BDCs are structured similar to real estate investment trusts (REITs) in that the BDC structure reduces or eliminates corporate income tax. In return, REITs are required to distribute 90% of their income, which may be taxable to its investors.

Relative to other BDCs, ACAS's investment portfolio has a higher concentration of equities leading to a more volatile asset base. BDCs generally trade as a multiple of book relative to the FV/Cost of the investment portfolio.

Valuation

Valuation was looked at three different ways:

(1) Current NAV/Share
(a) 5% discount
(b) 15% discount
(c) 35% discount


This indicates potential upside of (-3.4% to +41.2%) or an expected value of (+21%)

(2) Multiple of FYE 2011 NOI:
(a) Base Case: Asset leverage of 45%. Asset Interest Income Yield of 13%. Equity Dividend Yield of 5.5%
(b) Low Case: Asset leverage of 40%. Asset Interest Income Yield of 13%. Equity Dividend Yield of 4.0%
(c) High Case: Asset leverage of 50%. Asset Interest Income Yield of 14%. Equity Dividend Yield of 6.5%


This indicates potential upside of (-32.2% to +90.4%) or an expected value of (+23.3%)

(3) Comparable Basis:
(a) Min, Max, & Median multiples of NAV/share
(a) Min, Max, & Median multiples of FYE 2011 NOI


This indicates potential upside of (-1.3% to +135.5%) or an expected value of (+45.0%)

Taking it all together:


Risks

(1) Even if the reorganization is successful, a worsening of the macroeconomy will negatively effect the fundamental performance of ACAS's investment portfolio companies. Coupled with a further contraction in middle-market transaction multiples, there may be an even more significant decline in the FV of the portfolio.
(2) It is unclear how an inflationary environment will affect the business:
(a) On the one hand, the interest income will rise as rates rise, but,
(b) Inflation may erode fundamental value at the portfolio level.
(3) Any liquidity crisis will make portfolio realizations and further balance sheet restructuring difficult to execute.
(4) It is unclear how dilutive future equity offerings may be (esp. at a discount to book) although it seems that management is very valuation sensitive to this risk.

Read more...

6.27.2010

Distressed Debt Analysis: Reader's Digest

On February 22nd, Reader's Digest emerged from bankruptcy. For those that are interested, the bankruptcy docket for Reader's Digest can be found here: Reader's Digest bankruptcy docket


Before I get to any analysis, I thought it would be interesting to note to readers that even though Reader's Digest has emerged from bankruptcy, there are still a number of things going on in the bankruptcy court. Some of these filings deal with advisor fees, or tax issues and sometimes things out of left field. For instance, according to docket 764:
Shortly after the occurrence of the Plan Effective Date, Canyon contacted counsel for the Reorganized Debtors regarding its distribution of New Warrants pursuant to the Plan because the Canyon Funds had not received any such distribution. Canyon timely submitted its Class 3 ballots and voted to accept the Plan and has advised the Reorganized Debtors that its funds holding Senior Subordinated Note Claims in the aggregate face amount of approximately $51.3 million intended to submit Class 6 ballots in favor of the Plan, but neither the Reorganized Debtors nor Canyon have evidence of such ballots being submitted prior to the Voting Deadline.

Based on their Class 6 claim amounts, the Canyon Funds are entitled to receive 163,567 New Warrants. Issuing the additional warrants will result in a total of 1,863,394 New Warrants being issued under the Plan (reflecting rights to acquire 6.3% of the New Common Stock issued as of the Effective Date, subject to the terms and conditions of the New Warrant Agreement).
Generally speaking, a lot of these post-confirmation proceedings will not help in our analysis. Sometimes, where there is litigation, there could be updates posted in the bankruptcy court that will update the court on the state of the litigation - but you can follow the litigation generally on its own docket (remember a lot of junior creditors these days are receiving funds from litigation as part of their recovery, so it is important to follow said cases).

Back to RDA. Reader's Digest's equity is traded off quite a few of the distressed desks. For example, JP Morgan was making a market 20.00-20.50 around the close on Friday. In addition to RDA's equity, they have a $525M Senior Secured Note that trades right around par (L+650, 3% Floor). The bond was initially priced at 97, so has done decently well in the high yield market. As of 3/31/2010, the company has $189M of cash on hand, and an a nearly unused $50M revolver. All this results in gross leverage and net leverage of 3.1x and 2.0x respectively.

One thing I like when analyzing a new credit like this is a sufficient amount of disclosure. Their first quarter announcement is incredibly detailed which gives us a good amount of information on their various businesses. In addition, the conference call transcript was quite informative. This tells me management does not have much to hide at this point and is doing its best to communicate with investors. As well they should, as management has warrants to receive 7.5% of the stock.

Management commented on the conference call that given current EBITDA levels ($167M) its low level of capex and cash taxes as well as moderate interest expense, the company "yields high free cash flow." With that said, if EBITDA materially declines, or the company needs to invest substantial amounts of fixed capital to stem revenue declines, the value proposition here might be less attractive.

Reader's Digest operates out of 4 segments: Reader's Digest United States, Reader's Digest International, Lifestyle and Entertainment Direct, and Other. Of the four groups, only Lifestyle and Entertainment Direct showed signs of increasing revenue in 1Q 2010. According to the company's website: "Lifestyle & Entertainment Direct is a global direct marketing business that sells an array of products, including Time Life products under license, primarily through DRTV." Despite revenues being down in 3 out of 4 segments, EBITDA margins expanded in the quarter by approximately 200bps.

For those that do not know what DRTV is - it stands for direct response television - TV advertisers put up a website or a 1-800 number and consumers respond - Reader's Digest Fitness Product has shown significant strength in this market. On the conference call, Mary Berner, the company's CEO stated: "We have an exceptional marketing channel in DRTV, and we intend to more aggressively exploit this robust channel by selling more of our own brands
through it, as well as continuing to work with partner brands."

Currently, RDA's comps trade on the order of 5-6.5x. With that in mind, and using the LTM EBITDA of $167M we can back into what valuation the market is implying for RDA:


Now there are two things we have to do to complete this analysis: 1) How much EBITDA is going to decline? and 2) How much cash flow will be generated in the interim period?

I am going to be conservative and use 3 cases: An annual 15% drop in EBITDA, a 7.5% EBITDA decrease, and a flat EBITDA over the next two years.


So using 5.5x, in 2 years, RDA is worth between 16 and 28 dollars a share. If you are confident that either EBITDA will be flat or that the resulting multiple is more than 5.5x (I am confident of neither), than you would be a buyer of this stock. At a trading level of 20.5, I find RDA as fairly valued here and would neither buy nor sell the stock.

That being said, given the situation above, cash levels at RDA will be near $300M (all else being equal). With debt outstanding of $525M, the debt looks pretty attractive here and probably trades at a discount to peers because of high yield investors typically being fearful of post reorg fixed income instruments.

Reader's Digest presents an interesting distressed debt opportunity and we will keep our reader's updated in the coming months.

Read more...

5.09.2010

Distressed Debt Analysis - Visteon (VSTNQ)

A few months ago we looked at the distressed debt of Visteon, given the enormous run-up in prices of the underlying securities. Since that post, and as expected, junior securities (equity and bonds) have rallied substantially as Visteon continues to put up strong numbers. In addition, there has been a number of negotiations behind the scene to get a better deal done. Let's take a stab and see if we can see what this thing is worth.


For reference: Here is Visteon's Bankruptcy Docket

Last week, Visteon ("the company") filed a new plan of reorganization with the bankruptcy court (Docket #3011). On the same day, the company filed a motion authorizing the debtors to enter into a plan support agreement, an equity commitment agreement, and a backstop agreement. In this document, the company gives us a little background of what has been going on in the case:
From the outset of these cases, Visteon has made clear that an expeditious exit from bankruptcy with a deleveraged capital structure supported by its OEM customers was its primary goal. To the end, Visteon has worked determinedly with its creditor constituents to develop a consensual plan of reorganization with all voting classes that would address its reorganization goals for the last several months. As a result of these efforts, Visteon has reached a milestone in putting forth a “toggle” plan of reorganization, filed contemporaneously with this Motion, that Visteon believes represents the best path toward a successful conclusion of these cases.

The Plan is comprised of two mutually exclusive sub plans—a rights offering plan (the “Rights Offering Sub Plan”), pursuant to which the holders of Visteon’s prepetition unsecured notes who are eligible to participate in the rights offering would have the opportunity to purchase 95% of the equity in reorganized Visteon in exchange for $1.25 billion in cash raised through a fully backstopped rights offering; and a claims conversion plan (the “Claims Conversion Sub Plan”), which is similar to the plan filed on March 15, 2010 in that the holders of Visteon’s term loan debt would receive approximately 85% of the equity in reorganized Visteon and unsecured note holders would receive approximately 15% of the equity in reorganized Visteon, while other general unsecured creditors would receive a cash payout. The fundamental tenet of the Plan is that if the note holders deliver $1.25 billion in cash plus an exit financing facility to pay the term lenders in full, the Debtors will move forward with the Rights Offering Sub Plan; while if the note holders do not deliver the capital, they will be required to support a “toggle” to the Claims Conversion Sub Plan pursuant to the terms of the Plan Support Agreement and Equity Commitment Agreement, except under very narrow circumstances that the Debtors largely control. In the Debtors’ view, the toggle plan offers the cleanest path to confirmation that would avoid a costly four-sided cram down fight and would localize and simplify a valuation fight to one between old equity, on the one hand, and everyone else, on the other. The “toggle” plan construct allows note holders to truly put their money where their mouth is, while minimizing the Debtors’ risk of being left at the confirmation altar without a confirmable plan if the note holders do not live up to their promise to deliver capital. The Plan also avoids what would be costly and protracted cram down litigation with the Debtors’ note holders and resolves disputes over valuation among all parties other than “out of the money” equity holders who will dispute any valuation that does not provide them with a recovery.

The Plan is fully supported by note holders holding more than two-thirds in amount of Visteon’s prepetition unsecured notes and the Debtors continue to work towards obtaining the support of the official committee of unsecured creditors, a proxy for the general unsecured creditor class. While the term lenders have not yet indicated a willingness to support the Plan, Visteon notes that the term lenders would receive the same, or an equivalent recovery, to which they would have recovered under the March 15, 2010 plan. Specifically, the term lenders would be paid in full, in cash, including accrued prepetition and postpetition interest, and therefore would be unimpaired, and without voting rights, under the Rights Offering Sub Plan and would receive virtually the same treatment under the Claims Conversion Sub Plan as was contemplated by the Debtors’ March 15, 2010 plan, for which they previously provided their support. Thus, the Debtors believe that the term lenders ultimately will support the Plan. Lastly, while the Debtors expect equity holders to oppose the Plan, such holders are deemed to reject the Plan and will not be entitled to vote—making their support irrelevant to Plan confirmation.
Now that is a mouthful I know. Let's break it down:
  • 2 possible paths: 1) Rights offering funded by bondholders after which they will get 95% of the equity and will pay down the term loan from the funds raised 2) If rights offering fails, old plan is the go where term lenders own the vast majority of the company 3) Equity gets nothing
What I found most interesting about this plan was point #3 above. Earlier in the month, the U.S. Trustee recommended the appointment of an examiner after the ad hoc equity committee requested one. From a recent court filing:
On February 26, 2010, the Debtors released 2009 year-end financial results that dramatically changed the course of these cases. The Debtors’ enormously improved financial performance, as well as the market’s reflection of the bright prospects for the automotive sector and the economy as a whole, have rendered the Debtors’ intended path for these cases illegal and improvident. Indeed, prior to the release of the 2009 financial results, the Debtors filed a plan that provided no recovery for unsecured debt, much less equity. Now, that same unsecured debt is trading above par plus accrued interest. To pretend that this is a typical case where the Debtor has worked over the course of a year towards an inevitable plan that extinguishes equity is disingenuous. Yet, despite these different circumstances, the Debtors remain on approximately the same path as before and continue to stand behind a plan that rests on erroneous valuations and projections simply unsupported and refuted by the currently improving financial landscape.

In addition, equity holders have filed a motion to terminate the debtor's exclusivity and to solicit votes their their own Chapter 11 plan. What is equity arguing specifically? Undervaluation. As a reference, most equity committee's argue for undervaluation, but in Visteon's case, the argument is fairly compelling: Why? Visteon has a massive amount of value in its JV and cash on its balance sheet which current plans are undervaluing (2.5x net income? HA).

The equity committee is proposing a new plan where the term loan lenders would be partially reinstated (paid down with an equity rights offering), bond holders would receive a new security, and equity would be reinstated. The downside of this plan: The company would be emerging with a significant amount of debt which in a judge's eyes would make it less favorable to a competing plan.

For reference, Visteon's EBITDA was $161M in 1Q 2010 vs $22M in 1Q 2009. Strong. Cash at year end is approximately $1 billion dollars. The trading level of securities:

  • Term Loan: 106-108
  • Visteon 8.25% of 2010: 111/112
  • Visteon 7% of 2014: 112/113
  • Visteon 12.25% of 106: 115/117
  • Equity: $1.70 resulting in a market cap of $221M.
Let's figure out how much this puppy is worth:
  • Halla: Visteon has a 70% position of a Korean auto supplier. The company today has a $1.4B USD market cap...$980M of value.
  • Other non consolidated JVs: Mostly Yanfeng: "The major products are automotive interior and exterior trim products. such as seat assembly. instrument panel assembly,door trim panel assembly, steering wheel assembly, sun visor assembly, color bumper, B pillar and C D pillar etc. " Visteon owns 50%. Assume $80M of attributable net income (meaning the 50% that the company gets) at a 10x multiple...$800M
  • Cash - $964M ... Assume 50% is retained...Approximately $500M of value
So before even looking at Visteon's underlying operations we have approximately $2.3B of value.

Because Halla is consolidated in Visteon's results, we need to back out their cash flow and then apply a multiple to stand-alone Visteon's EBITDA. Halla is doing right under $140M of EBITDA, so run-rate stand-alone Visteon is probably close to $300M on a VERY conservative case. At a 5x multiple, we get another $1.5B of value. Net, net...Total value is $3.8B.

For debt claims, I am using $3.2B. Therefore the excess value to equity is $600M against 130M shares outstanding leads to a share price between $4 and $5. This valuation also does not give them any credit for NOLs. But we like to be conservative here at Distressed Debt Investing.

So we think equity has value here - the question is...will they get any of it? It really depends on how the judge plays his hand. And I will save portfolio positioning for the next post. We will discuss the implications of the varying guarantees of the bonds (the 12.25% have certain guarantees that other notes do not have), the possibility of equity get a nuisance value claim and how that affects portfolio positioning. Finally, we will talk about par + accrued and possibly make-wholes to determine our downside on the bonds.

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hunter [at] distressed-debt-investing [dot] com

About Me

I have spent the majority of my career as a value investor. For the past 8 years, I have worked on the buy side as a distressed debt and high yield investor.